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DISSERTATION ABSTRACT 
 
Jordan Leigha Livingston 
 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
Department of Psychology 
 
September 2018 
 
Title: Toward an Integrative Study of Self 
 
 
The study of self within psychology has been limited in a number of ways. Two 
sets of empirical studies extended the study of self beyond traditional trait-based self-
perception. In the first set of studies, seven hundred and eighty-nine adults listed their 
multiple “self-aspects” that represent meaningful elements of their lives and completed 
trait ratings for each of their self-aspects. The similarity between trait responses for the 
different self-aspects indicated the degree of “self-complexity” for a participant, as well 
as the degree of “self-integration.” Results replicated previous findings indicating that 
lower self-complexity is associated with higher well-being, and that network-based 
approaches for measuring self-complexity were more strongly with well-being. Finally, 
participants who completed the same task 3 weeks later demonstrated an increase in self-
integration. Broadly, the results demonstrate that network-based approaches are an 
effective metric for studying the structure of the self and that future work may have 
success using networks to inform identity-based interventions. 
In the second set of studies, five hundred and ninety-four adults completed studies 
about personal identity and morality. Participants imagined that some trait about someone 
had changed and were asked to indicate the degree to which the trait change would 
change the person’s identity. Comparisons of interest examined the degree to which 
 v 
 
moral trait changes led to more perceived identity change than non-moral trait changes 
and the degree to which imagining changes to oneself versus to another person yielded 
differences in perceived identity change. Results replicated previous work indicating that 
morals lead to most perceived identity change and find that changes to self yielded large 
perceived identity change than changes to a friend. Moreover, neuroimaging work 
revealed that thinking about identity change for both targets recruits regions of the 
cortical midline and that thinking about moral trait words does not recruit any regions 
compared to thinking about non-moral trait words, challenging previous assumptions 
about the nature of self-perception and personal identity. Results from both sets of studies 
were integrated with philosophical and translational perspectives to consider the overall 
contributions to real-world, self-control issues and broader questions about the nature of the 
self. 
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1 
CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTON 
 
 
 
Definitions of self and identity within psychology and neuroscience are 
“extremely wide- ranging and [lack] uniformity” (VandenBos, 2007). Researchers in the 
field have approached the study of self from many directions, the result of which has 
been an outpouring of self-hyphenated terms: self-regulation, self-esteem, self-
knowledge, self-concept, self-perception, and more (Katzko, 2003; Klein, 2012a). 
Despite their similar root structure, the degree to which these words reference the same 
“self” or aspect of “self” remains unclear, leading some to claim that, based on 
philosophical grounds, the word has even lost its meaning (Wittgenstein, 1953; Bergner, 
2017). At the broader level, the study of self lacks clarity and coherence – a broader 
organizational structure that gives the study of self purpose – a structure and purpose to 
which the current dissertation aims to contribute. 
Ironically, even though approaches to the psychological study of self have lacked 
coherence, most approaches have been limited in similar ways. First, most research 
examining the self has approached the self as a single, unified construct at the expense of 
either ignoring or failing to integrate approaches that view the self as multidimensional 
(e.g., McConnell, 2011). This idea is implicit in many of the self-hyphenated terms listed 
above. Second, most research examining the self has studied the self at one moment in 
time (i.e., “synchronic” self) at the expense of failing to examine the continuity of self 
over time (i.e., “diachronic” self) (Northoff, 2017). As a result, much of the seemingly 
  
 
2 
wide-ranging psychological literature on self has been limited to a relatively narrow 
subset of information.   
The same limitations have applied in the neuroscience literature, perhaps even 
more so. The first investigations of the neuroscience of self utilized a task that prompts 
participants to rate the extent to which different personality trait words described 
themselves (Craik et al., 1999; Johnson, Baxter, Wilder, Pipe, Heiserman, & Prigatano, 
2002; Kelley, Macrae, Wyland, Caglar, Inati, & Heatherton, 2002). Participants 
completing this task are presented with single prompts (e.g., “Self” or “Friend”) that 
indicate the target of reference, as well as single trait words (e.g., “Polite” or 
“Talkative”), and are asked to indicate whether or not the trait word describes the target. 
In the same way that the psychological study of self has been limited, this task is limited 
in that the traits presented are implied to describe a single, de-contextualized self, 
neglecting other dimensions, such as time and social roles, that could be critical for 
constructing a comprehensive neural representation of self. The trait-based tasks were 
presumably designed as first attempts to address the topic and were derived from the 
somewhat limited, strictly cognitive perspective at the time (e.g., tasks adapted from the 
memory literature). Many studies have since examined the neural activity underlying 
self-relevant cognition in a number of ways (Denny, Kober, Wagner, & Ochsner, 2012; 
Wagner, Haxby, & Heatherton, 2012), but the gold standard in the field, the task that is 
used to reliably elicit self-referential activity, is the same, trait-focused task used in these 
first studies (e.g., Moore, 2015).  
Different frameworks have been proposed as an attempt to organize and advance 
the comprehensive study of self. Many psychologists have pointed to the Jamesian 
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knowing, subjective “I” versus the known, objective “me” distinction as a helpful 
framework for organizing the functional relationships between the “selves” in the self-
hyphenated terms. Even so, most traditional studies of self and identity in the field have 
investigated the “me,” (i.e., the content of the self) without considering how it relates to 
the “I,” despite suggestions that the systems likely are not as separate as they may seem 
(Northoff, 2007; Ochsner & Gross, 2007). However, clarifying this relationship is 
difficult without first acknowledging the full scope of self-relevant content (e.g., actor, 
agent, and author) that allows the I to conceive of the Me (McAdams, 2013). 
The full scope of self-relevant content can be captured within a framework that 
identifies the various levels at which we can know and describe a person (McAdams, 
1995). The first level at which we can know someone consists of the familiar trait 
approach that attempts to characterize an individual’s broad, decontextualized 
disposition. For example, at this level, a person might be described as “polite” or 
“talkative,” but these traits are limited in that they are both nonconditional – that is, they 
do not take the role of context into account, as well as comparative – that is, they are 
designed to tell us how an individual compares to others on different trait dimensions, but 
they do not tell us much about the content that uniquely identifies a person over time. 
This is also the level at which most neuroscience studies have investigated the self.  
The second level under this approach identifies an individual’s “personal 
concerns,” such as their goals, motivations, and values that are more contextualized to 
particular times and roles. For example, at this level, we might learn that an individual is 
talkative because they are uncomfortable with silence but that they are striving to listen 
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more and talk less. This arguably provides observers with more information that uniquely 
characterizes this person compared to the first level.  
The final level in this model identifies the narrative self that individuates a person, 
generates meaning and purpose for that person, and integrates elements of an individual’s 
life experience across both content and time. Description at this level consists of detailing 
the key scenes, characters, and themes that characterize an individual’s life in important 
domains, such as this talkative individual’s autobiographical experiences of engaging in 
meaningful and mundane conversations with others. Importantly, the framework claims 
that we cannot know a person, know their self or their identity, without considering 
information from each of these levels. Even so, consideration for the information 
involved at these final two levels has been relatively lacking from the literature on self-
relevant processing. 
Clarifying information at these final two levels is important for a number of 
reasons. First, from a functional perspective, clarifying the nature of the self is critical for 
understanding how identity can be used as an effective motivational tool to help 
individuals pursue their goals (Berkman, Livingston, & Kahn, 2017). Questions 
surrounding the self and its role in directing intentional, goal-oriented behavior are 
perennial in both philosophy and psychology. In contrast to the Platonic notion of self-
control in which a metaphorical charioteer is challenged with the task of steering one 
rational and one impulsive horse in the same direction, many contemporary philosophers 
point towards the role that the value-laden self can play in guiding successful, controlled 
behaviors. For example, it has been argued that intentional behavior is feasible strictly 
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because individuals use their own values to guide their decisions (Bechtel, 2008) and that 
willful behavior requires the ability to engage the desires of the self (Frankfurt, 1988).
 
 
Such philosophical perspectives are in accordance with a new, value-based model 
of self-control that aims to improve upon existing dual-process models of self-control 
(Berkman, Hutcherson, Livingston, Kahn, & Inzlicht, 2017). To date, most studies 
investigating self-control have operated under a dual-systems approach that defines self-
control as a competition between hot, impulsive desires and cold, effortful driven control. 
Although dual systems models fit well with the phenomenological experience of 
engaging in self-control, they cannot account for a number of behavioral findings in the 
self-control literature, such as ego depletion (Berkman, Kahn, & Livingston, 2016); nor is 
there strong evidence for a negative relationship between control-based regions and 
reward-based regions of the brain to support this model (Kelley, Wagner, & Heatherton, 
2015). In contrast, the value-based model of self-control draws upon evidence from the 
neuroeconomics literature to propose that self-control, or the act of choosing amongst any 
number of mutually exclusive options for the purposes of engaging in goal-oriented 
behavior, can be thought of as the output of a value-based calculation amongst competing 
options. In this model, valuation is a core mechanism of self-control that can 
parsimoniously account for a wide variety of psychological phenomena (e.g., the 
endowment effect, temporal discounting, etc.) and that is extensively supported by the 
existing neuroscience literature (Hutcherson, Bushong & Rangel, 2015; Kable & 
Glimcher, 2007).  
The implication of the model is that, because higher valued inputs determine 
behavioral output, interventions aimed at motivating successful goal pursuit can increase 
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the relative weight of relevant value inputs. There are a number of potential avenues to 
doing so (e.g., monetary value, social support), but the psychological literature suggests 
that perhaps the most salient route to high value is identity. Not only is identity both 
chronically accessible as well as stable across time (Markus & Kunda, 1986), but it also 
tends to be positive in nature (Rosenberg, 1979; Steele, 1988), at least in healthy 
individuals. Indeed, evidence from within psychology supports the idea that identity can 
facilitate different forms of successful self-regulation (Schmeichel & Vohs, 2009; Ersner-
Hershfield, Wimmer, & Knutson, 2009; Higgins, Roney, Crowe, & Charles, 1994). 
Moreover, recent neuroimaging studies note strong overlap between neural activity 
associated with thinking about identity and value (Kim & Johnson, 2015, Northoff & 
Hayes, 2011), activity which is also often predictive of successful goal-pursuit (Berkman 
& Falk, 2013). In fact, a meta-analysis and conjunction using a database (Yarkoni, 
Poldrack, Nichols, Van Essen, & Wager, 2011) of neuroimaging studies on self and value 
reveals a large cluster of overlapping activation in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex 
(vmPFC), suggesting that the two constructs may be intimately related, if not one in the 
same. As a result, the identity-value model of self-regulation extends the value-based 
model of self-control to propose that identity serves as particularly promising target of 
intervention (Berkman, Livingston, & Kahn, 2017).  
The identity-value model has been well-received as an important contribution to 
the literature (e.g., Hackel & Zaki, 2017; Lempert & Kable, 2017); however, critical 
questions about the nature of identity remain unexplored (Livingston, Kahn, & Berkman, 
2017). Perhaps most critically, if identity is to serve as a target of intervention, it is 
unclear how identity can remain at once stable and flexible; that is, it is unclear how 
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identity can serve as a potent and accessible source of value while remaining amenable to 
intervention. The model’s seemingly contradictory demands are nearly impossible to 
satisfy when assuming the dominant, unitary account of self in the literature. A more 
comprehensive account that considers the self across different contexts and across time, 
however, might be better able to simultaneously satisfy the identity-value model’s claims. 
Not only can understanding information about the self across context and time 
inform functionalist approaches, but investigating the self at these final two levels can 
help to advance ontological questions about the nature of the self. Many of these key 
questions center around how the self is unified across both content and time (Klein, 
2012b), and philosophers have a number of frameworks for addressing these types of 
questions. A comprehensive review of these frameworks lies outside of the scope of this 
dissertation, but two distinctions are particularly helpful for studying the self across 
context and time. First, with regards to context, William James (1890) is careful to 
distinguish between the social selves that constitute roles for the self and the spiritual self 
that constitutes the perception of a unified self. Such a distinction proves particularly 
valuable when considering the relationship between empirical approaches that examine 
an individual’s multiple selves (see Chapter 2) and more traditional approaches that 
assume a unified self. Second, with regards to time, recent work is a careful to distinguish 
between the narrative self, the collection of the identities that one possesses and personal 
identity, the core subject that possesses all of those identities (Peacocke, 2014). Such a 
distinction proves particularly relevant when considering the relationships between 
empirical approaches examining personal identity (see Chapter 3) and broader narrative-
based approaches to studying the self. 
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Integrative approaches that attempt to unify seemingly separate conceptions of 
self to meet broader functionalist and ontological needs have the potential to advance the 
study of self. Although the advantages of an integrative approach might appear obvious 
to some, calls for integrated approaches across the humanities and sciences are often met 
with either “indifference or hostility” (Slingerland & Collard, 2011). However, the 
advantages of such integrative approaches are recently becoming evident. Despite the 
limitations of the original studies that investigated the neuroscience of self (discussed 
earlier in this chapter), these studies were, in many ways, integrative. For example, one of 
these studies (Kelley et al., 2002) applied neuroscience methods to address a question at 
the nexus of cognitive science and social psychology: namely, is memory for the self 
special? Although the types of claims that can be drawn from the trait-based methods 
used in this study are, in many ways, limited, the findings from the study have recently 
provided the groundwork for a number of important discoveries about the self, including 
the discovery that neural activity about the self can be predictive of real-world behavior 
(Berkman & Falk, 2013) and that neural activity about the self is highly overlapping with 
value-based activity (Berkman, Livingston, & Kahn, 2017). Extending the study of self to 
include more role-based and time-based perspectives has the potential to push this 
groundwork even further.  
The current dissertation contributes towards an integrative approach by extending 
the study of self-relevant processing to consider the role of context and time. Chapter 2 
explores elements of self-complexity and reports the results of an empirical investigation 
on multiple selves. Chapter 3 discusses elements of self-continuity and reports the results 
of an empirical investigation on personal identity and the moral self. Finally, Chapter 4 
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discusses and integrates the results from Chapters 2 and 3 to consider how these studies 
contribute to the study of the self across context and time. 
This suite of papers extends traditional approaches towards the study of self in a 
number of important ways. Notably, by transitioning away from trait-centered approaches 
and toward goal- and narrative-based approaches, the dissertation steers away from the 
traditional synchronic perspective on self and towards a diachronic perspective on self 
that considers contextual roles and changes over time. Moreover, the dissertation’s 
methodologies pull from a variety of disciplines, both philosophical and translational, to 
achieve the projects’ aims. The result is a contribution towards an integrative study of 
self, both in method as well as in result.  
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CHAPTER II 
 
MULTIPLE SELVES  
 
 
 
One Self or Many? 
 
 In his self-explorative tome In Search of Lost Time, Proust declares "I have 
developed the habit of becoming myself a different person [...]: a jealous, an indifferent, a 
voluptuous, a melancholy, a frenzied." Proust’s different persons are contextually driven 
elements that are stored in memory as remnants of selves (Landy, 2001). In other words, 
this Proustian self which so famously characterizes the human experience is one that also 
maintains a many-tiered structure of sub-selves (Kemp, 2005). 
Unlike Proust, most psychological research exams the single, unified self at the 
expense of failing to examine its multiple, context-dependent selves (e.g., McConnell, 
2011). Although this preference for studying the unity of self over its multiple aspects is 
rarely made explicit (e.g., Baumeister, 1998), the tendency is implicit within many sub-
domains of psychology. For example, research on self-protective mechanisms assumes a 
unified self when examining the effects of exercises that affirm core, unifying values on 
self-integrity in the face of threats (Steele, 1988). Self-esteem research assumes a unified 
self when asserting that there is a general, unified, positively affected feeling one can 
have towards the self (Rosenburg, 1979). And many lines of research on accuracy (e.g., 
self-knowledge) assume a unified self in asserting that there is one, true self that we 
either do or do not come to know (Vazire & Carlson, 2010). Much of the seemingly 
wide-ranging psychological literature on self has been limited to a relatively narrow 
definition.   
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The multiple self-aspects framework suggests that, contrary to the traditional 
assumptions of a singular self in psychology, the self is composed of multiple, context-
dependent self-aspects (McConnell, 2011). Despite its non-dominant status, the 
perspective that the self can be broken into sub-components is not new. Multiple-self 
perspectives date back at least as far as William James who asserted that we have “many 
social selves” (1890), and since James, numerous dichotomies and trichotomies dividing 
the self into different aspects have emerged. The self can be divided into the past, present, 
and future self (D’Argembou, Stawarczyk, Majerus, Collette, Van der Linden, & Salmon, 
2010), tracking its course through time, and into the actual, ought, and ideal self, tracking 
its aspirational statuses (Higgins, 1987). It can be divided into the independent and 
interdependent self-elements, tracking relationships with other individuals (Markus & 
Kitayama, 1991), as well as into different social roles (Roberts & Donahue, 1994). 
However, these existing frameworks divide the self into separate, pre-specified 
dimensions of self, lacking any form of integration across the dimensions. 
The developmental literature has also long recognized that the self is fragmented. 
This perspective is inherent in the idea that the self is constructed over time, such that 
self-perception becomes increasingly more complex as a child assumes new social roles 
and develops new relationships (Harter, 2012). The process of self-construction is 
particularly salient during adolescence when younger adults are still exploring many 
aspects of their self and identity, including their goals, motivations, and responsibilities 
(Becht et al., 2016; Meeus, Iedema, Helsen, & Vollebergh, 1999). A key aspect of 
development, then, is the acquisition of differentiated, domain-specific self-concepts 
(Pfeifer & Berkman, in press), but, to date, the study of the self as just that – a collection 
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of different self-concepts - has been relatively lacking from the social psychological 
literature. 
The Multiple Self-Aspects Framework 
The multiple self-aspects framework directly addresses this lack of consideration 
for the differentiated self. Importantly, rather than constraining the boundaries of self to 
any pre-specified divisions, the multiple self-aspects framework allows elements of self 
(i.e., self-aspects) to vary idiosyncratically across individuals. The framework is inspired 
by evidence suggesting that when individuals are asked to sort trait words into categories 
that represent meaningful aspects of their lives, they typically identify four to five key 
self-aspects comprised of various social roles (e.g., student self), identities (e.g., sorority 
self), relationships (e.g., girlfriend self), goals (e.g., ideal self), or affective states (e.g., 
stressed self) that organize their experiences and help to direct their actions (McConnell 
& Strain, 2007). Notably, these self-aspects are idiosyncratic in that they are uniquely 
identified by each individual, a development that distinguishes this approach from the 
other lines of work that only examine particular, pre-specified dimensions of the 
multifaceted self. 
The multiple self-aspects framework has a number of other unique features. In 
particular, not all trait words are used for each participant, and some of the same trait 
words are used to describe different self-aspects, yielding a highly individualized self-
knowledge structure that overlap by different amounts across individuals. Within 
individuals, self-aspects are accessible to varying degrees at any one given time (Brown, 
Bailey, Stoll, & McConnell, 2016), accessibility is malleable and context-dependent such 
that different self-aspects are accessible to varying degrees in different situations, and the 
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relative accessibility of a node in a given moment impacts the self’s overall affect (i.e., 
experienced positivity of the self) (McConnell, Rydell, & Brown, 2009). What emerges is 
an integrated collection of self-aspects that are relatively stable but whose relationships 
are flexible across time. 
To date, this organizational structure has been measured using a single metric of 
self-complexity. This metric takes into account both the total number of self-aspects 
listed by an individual, as well as the degree to which an individual’s self-aspects share 
trait attributes with one another, using an H-statistic (Scott, 1969): H = log2 n – (∑ ni log2 
ni) / n, in which n represents the total number of traits presented to the participant and ni 
represents the number of traits that fall under each self-aspect grouping (i) identified by 
the participant (McConnell et al., 2005). An individual who has a higher number of self-
aspects that share less attributes with one another is said to have high self-complexity, 
and an individual who has a lower number of self-aspects that share more trait attributes 
with one another is said to have low self-complexity. Research in this area suggests that 
self-complexity is a measurable phenomenon within an individual that varies across 
individuals in systematic ways.  
Self-Complexity and Well-Being 
Measuring self-complexity is important not just for validating ideas within 
psychology, but also for predicting real-world outcomes. Meta-analysis reveals that 
individuals with higher self-complexity generally experience worse physical and 
psychological health outcomes than individuals with lower self-complexity (Rafaeli-Mor 
& Steinberg, 2002), although it is not entirely clear why lower self-complexity seems to 
confer advantages, on average. Some work has suggested that perceived self-aspect 
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control moderates the relationship such that lower self-complexity is associated with 
better well-being insofar as it helps individuals feel more in control of their self-aspects 
(McConnell et al., 2005). This perspective is consistent with clinical approaches that 
diagnose individuals with dissociative identity disorder to the extent that they lack 
consensus and integration between their various selves and report feeling out of control 
(Vanderlinden, Van Dyck, Vandereycken, Vertommen, & Jan Verkes, 1993).  
Although lower self-complexity is associated with well-being on average, its 
advantages may be context-dependent. Whereas lower self-complexity is associated with 
well-being for individuals who already have positive influences in their life, such as a 
social support network and socially desirable personality traits, it is also associated with 
poorer well-being for individuals who have experienced negative life events (McConnell, 
Strain, Brown, & Rydell, 2009). Such findings are in line with the buffering hypothesis, 
which states that high self-complexity can be helpful for buffering the self from threats 
(Linville, 1985). Indeed, evidence suggests that multifaceted selves can buffer mood in 
response to negative self-feedback (Linville, 1985; Dixon & Baumeister, 1991), can 
reduce distress in response to a breakup (Smith & Cohen, 1993), and can help individuals 
cope in the face of trauma (Nijenhuis & van der Hart, 2011; DePrince & Freyd, 2014). 
Individuals greater in self-complexity, it seems, are better able to resist threats to one self 
because their selves, as a whole, are not integrated.  
Malleability of the Self 
 To date, then, self-complexity has been examined as a stable individual difference 
measure that predicts the extent to which individuals experience certain health outcomes 
(Rafaeli-Mor & Steinberg, 2002). Given the relationship between self-complexity and 
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measures of well-being, however, intervention work may want to consider targeting self-
complexity in order to facilitate well-being. Of course, the relationship may be bi-
directional, such that changes to well-being may affect self-complexity. However, a 
recent model of self-regulation hypothesizes that targeting identity is an effective way to 
achieve certain forms of well-being (Berkman, Livingston, & Kahn, 2017).   
 The main advantage of targeting identity is that it is both stable, providing a 
strong source of value, and flexible, or amenable to intervention. On the surface, these 
characteristics seem incompatible with one another (Molden, Hall, Hui, & Scholar, 
2017), but only if one assumes the self to be a unified entity. Fortunately, the multiple 
self-aspects framework provides two potential stable and flexible sources of identity 
which may be differentially amenable to intervention: the self-aspects themselves and the 
relationships between them. 
 There are techniques psychologists may be able to use to try to introduce new 
self-aspects or to manipulate existing self-aspects and/or the way they relate to one 
another. For example, cognitive dissonance hypothesizes that motivating someone to 
engage in a new behavior may lead them to justify that new behavior by incorporating it 
into their identity (Festinger, 1957). Similarly, certain persuasive techniques, such as the 
availability heuristic, can be utilized to draw attention to certain behaviors for similar 
effects (Schwarz, Bless, Strack, Klumpp, Rittenauer-Schatka, & Simons, 1991). 
Contemporary philosophers have even theorized that elements of identity can be 
“summoned” in a self-fulfilling prophecy, such that individuals, in a sense, simply 
become what they are called by others (Alfano, 2015). Although the idea is intriguing, 
psychologists have also long recognized the role of autonomy in behavioral change (Deci 
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& Ryan), challenging the notion that new identities can be feasibly introduced or nudged 
from outside sources.  
Rather than introducing new self-aspects, self-complexity may be more easily 
modified by targeting the relationships between existing self-aspects. A limited subset of 
existing strategies from the self-regulation literature have demonstrated that modifying 
the way that individuals relates to themselves can promote behavior change. For example, 
self-distancing, which requires individuals to maintain a removed perspective from the 
self (e.g., talking to the self in the third person) can effectively dampen emotional 
reactivity (Kross & Ayduk, 2011). Self-affirmation, which instructs individuals to think 
about a top-ranked value to the self, can encourage individuals to engage with health-
promoting information (Klein & Harris, 2009). And self-compassion, which encourages 
individuals to talk to themselves with care, as they would another person, has been shown 
to promote resilience to negative life events (Leary, Tate, Adams, Batts, & Hancock, 
2007). Despite the effectiveness of these interventions, they seem to act upon the self as a 
whole. Indeed, one of the mechanisms hypothesized to unify all of these self-oriented 
regulation strategies is cognitive abstraction, a form of psychological distance as 
achieved through high-level construal (Sklar & Fujita, 2017), which is a well-understood 
cognitive technique that prompts people to focus their attention on the global, primary 
features of an object or event in order to facilitate self-control (Fujita, Trope, Liberman, 
& Levin-Sagi, 2006). As a result, it’s unclear how these manipulations might impact self-
complexity. An intervention targeted at particular elements of the self may be more 
effective.  
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Although psychologists have traditionally focused on the self, as a whole, in 
researching self-regulatory techniques, various therapeutic techniques have focused on 
targeting different components of the multi-dimensional self. Third wave therapies, in 
particular, have focused on self-integration, not only across therapies, but also across the 
aspects of a given individual. For example, integrative psychotherapy focuses on 
integrating elements of personality into a coherent whole (Erskine & Trautmann, 1993). 
This emphasis on integration is in line with certain philosophical perspectives that 
identify integration as a key, desirable feature of personhood (Frankfurt, 1971) Other 
third wave therapies nod to the multidimensional nature of the self by acknowledging and 
addressing the particular needs of an individual in a given context (Hayes, 2004). 
Rather than changing self-aspects themselves, then, researchers may want to focus 
on developing tools that can target the relationships between existing self-aspects. 
Previous work has successfully targeted these relationships by using priming techniques 
to shift the relative accessibility of different self-aspects (McConnell, Rydell, & Brown, 
2009). However, it’s unclear how long-lasting these priming effects are. Rather than 
targeting accessibility, interventions may want to focus on targeting the trait level 
attributes associated with each of the self-aspects. Although traits are relatively stable 
(Caspi, Roberts, & Shiner, 2005), they are also known to shift under different contexts 
(e.g., Roberts, Luo, Briley, Chow, Su, & Hill, 2017). Thus, changing the relative 
associations between self-aspects, and their traits, across different contexts may be a 
viable method for encouraging individuals to think about themselves in ways that are 
beneficial to their well-being.  
The Case for Networks 
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A prerequisite for any meaningful scientific work focusing on the structure of the 
self is a nuanced measure that is capable of detecting shifts in the relationships between 
self-aspects. Whereas the h-statistic, the traditional measure of self-complexity, calculates 
scores based on binary (i.e., “yes” or “no”) self-categorizations, it is less sensitive to the 
changes of degree that would be expected from within-subject changes over time. For 
example, it is unlikely that a person who is not confident (i.e., a “no”) in in their athletic 
ability would suddenly rate their athletic self-aspect as “confident” (i.e., a “yes”) after a 
manipulation – the type of change required for the h-statistic to detect any differences; 
however, it’s possible someone might rate their athletic self-aspect as slightly more 
confident (e.g., an increase from a “2” to a “3” on a 7-point scale) after considering the 
ways in which their athletic self-aspect integrates with other aspects of their life.   
The H-statistic is also limited in that it cannot measure any potentially nuanced 
relationships between individual self-aspects. Although previous literature has indicated 
that lower self-complexity is, on average, associated with better well-being, subtle 
variations in how self-aspects relate to each other are likely meaningful to outcomes 
including, but not limited to, well-being. For example, because less overlapping self-
aspects can be helpful in the face of threat, it might be optimal for positive self-aspects to 
share overlapping qualities (low self-complexity) but for negative self-aspects to share 
less overlap (high self-complexity). Indeed, a parallel line of reasoning from the self-
affirmation literature in which the self, as a system, is motivated to protect its integrity in 
the face of threats would support this hypothesis (Sherman & Cohen, 2006). Bolstering 
(or “affirming”) different aspects of the self that are only weakly related to the threatened 
aspect of the self can protect against the deleterious effects of self-threat. An intervention 
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that either encourages integration or multidimensionality, then, may only be interested in 
measuring changes in overlap between particular traits. A more nuanced method for 
capturing these subtler relationships is needed.  
Tools derived from the branch of mathematics known as graph theory can be used 
to create visual maps called ‘networks’ that summarize people’s reports about their self-
aspects and uses information about the relationships between those self-aspects to 
generate related but separate metrics about those networks. Networks are made up of a 
collection of nodes (self-aspects) and edges (relationships between self-aspects). Edges 
can be defined in a variety of ways, but in many cases, they are defined by the correlation 
between two nodes. Tools from graph theory (Bondy & Murty, 1976; West, 2001) can be 
used to construct network maps and to calculate overall network-level metrics, such as 
size and clustering, from these networks. Size can be measured in a variety of ways, such 
as by simply counting the number of total nodes (self-aspects) in a network, and 
clustering indicates the extent to which nodes (self-aspects) cluster together into groups. 
These types of measures are helpful for understanding information about how all self-
aspects within a network relate to one another.  
Tools from graph theory can also be used to calculate node-level (self-aspect 
level) metrics, such as strength, betweenness, and closeness. Strength indicates 
information about the number of (weighted) connections for a particular self-aspect, 
betweenness indicates the extent to which a given self-aspect is located in the middle of 
connections between other self-aspects, and closeness provides information about the 
shortest (weighted) distances between a given self-aspect and all other self-aspects in the 
network. All of these measures can provide meaningful information about how important 
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a particular self-aspect is to a network (Costantini et al., 2014). Therefore, network 
approaches would likely be useful for both characterizing relationships between specific 
self-aspects, as well as for measuring their change over time. 
Insights from network-based approaches have been able to push psychological 
theory forward in a variety of domains. Applying network-based approaches to the study 
of personality, for example, has generated data that challenged long-held assumptions 
within the personality literature, which traditionally relies upon latent variable 
approaches (Costantini et al., 2014). And it’s been suggested that network approach 
would be similarly appropriate for examining relationships between identities within a 
person (Ramarajan, 2014). Applications of network analysis within neuroimaging has 
also advanced thinking on a number of topics, including the ability to identify collections 
of brain regions involved in certain neuropsychiatric disorders for particular individuals 
(Bullmore & Sporns, 2009). Also, the correlation matrices upon which these network 
analyses rely serve as the basis for a suite of other brain decoding techniques, many of 
which have revealed important insights about the structure of the self (e.g., Chavez, 
Wagner, & Heatherton, 2017).  
The Present Study 
 
The current set of studies extends the work on multiples selves in a number of 
important ways. Study 1 serves as a conceptual replication of the work by McConnell et 
al. (2005) on the relationship between self-complexity and well-being in an online, non-
student population, utilizing a continuous rating scale rather than a card sorting task. 
Study 2 extends the effect by developing and applying more nuanced graph theoretical 
techniques to build self-networks and by using them to measure self-complexity and its 
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relationship to well-being. Finally, Study 3 examines whether and how self-aspect 
structures can be both stable across time and also amenable to manipulation. This suite of 
studies aims not only to develop a novel method for investigating self-aspect structure, 
but to also contribute toward a broader literature thinking about the multiplicity of selves 
and the tools that can be used to measure the self in its many forms. 
Study 1: Replication 
Method 
Open science. The design, hypotheses, and analysis plan for this study were pre-
registered at the Open Science Framework (https://osf.io/t3hvj/).   
Participants. Participants (18 years of age or older, native English speaker, U.S. 
resident) were recruited from the Amazon Mechanical Turk population using 
TurkPrime’s data acquisition platform (Litman, Robinson, & Abberbock, 2017) to 
participate in a 30-minute online study inviting participants to make ratings about 
themselves. Sample size was determined through a power analysis using G*Power (Faul, 
Erdfelder, Buchner, & Lang, 2009) showing that a sample size of 506 (253 per condition) 
would be required to detect a small effect (d = 0.25) in an independent samples t-test with 
80% power. This is conservative because the primary analysis focuses on a mixed 
factorial ANOVA analysis, so the actual analysis might have more power than a simple t-
test. A 30% drop out rate in Study 3 as well as 10% data loss due to attention checks was 
estimated to determine the number of observations to gather. This sample size well-
exceeds the size of the sample (N = 127) of the study that my study aims to replicate 
(McConnell et al., 2005). Participants were excluded if they did not complete the survey 
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or failed either of two other attention checks included in the survey. The final sample for 
analysis included 789 participants (403 female, Mage = 38.29, SD = 12.06).  
Design. In this survey, participants were asked to generate a list of their self-
aspects and to make trait ratings for each, with no pre-specified conditions. 
Procedures. After consenting, participants generated a list of their self-aspects 
using instructions adapted from Showers (1992). A self-aspect was defined for 
participants as something that “identifies an important aspect of yourself or your life,” 
and were told to consider themselves across “different situations, relationships, roles, 
emotions, goals, and time periods.” Participants were presented with an example (Harry 
Potter) for reference but were encouraged to include any self-aspects that were 
meaningful to them. Participants were instructed to list as many or as few self-aspects as 
desired, were told that most people tend to list four to five self-aspects, and were required 
to list at least two (but no more than eight). Moreover, participants were notified that 
after generating their self-aspects, they would rate each of their self-aspects on both 
positive and negative trait words.  
Then, participants spent at least two minutes listing their self-aspects and were 
unable to proceed to the next section until two minutes had passed. In the next section, 
each individual’s self-aspects were then piped into a question in which participants were 
asked “to what extent does the following word describe your _______ self-aspect?” (1 = 
not at all to 7 = very much) for 40 different randomly presented traits words (20 positive 
and 20 negative) previously established as common self-descriptors (Showers, 1992) 
(Appendix A). The questions were presented in blocks so that participants answered all 
40 questions for one self-aspect before moving on to the next self-aspect, with order of 
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self-aspect blocks randomized (Figure 1). At the end of each block, participants were 
asked three more questions about overall centrality, positivity, and negativity for each 
self-aspect.  
 
Additionally, participants were asked to complete a variety of individual 
difference measures pertaining to physical well-being, including the Cohen-Hoberman 
Inventory of Physical Symptoms (Cohen & Hoberman, 1983) and the Perceived Stress 
Scale (Levine & Perkins, 1980) Cohen, Kamarck, & Mermelstein, 1983), measures 
pertaining to psychological well-being, including the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale 
List your self-aspects: 
1. Work Self 
2. Home Self 
To what extent does 
the word describe your 
WORK self? 
 
INTELLIGENT 
1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
To what extent does 
the word describe your 
HOME self? 
 
CONFIDENT 
1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
To what extent does 
the word describe your 
WORK self? 
 
CONFIDENT 
1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
To what extent does 
the word describe your 
WORK self? 
 
INTELLIGENT 
1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
Figure 1. Task procedure for generating and rating self-aspects. Participants were 
asked to list their self-aspects (up to eight) and then were asked to rate each self-
aspect on each of the traits. 
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(Rosenberg, 1965) and the Beck Depression Inventory (Beck, Ward, Mendelson, Mock, 
& Erbaugh, 1961), as well the Self-Concept Clarity Questionnaire (Campbell, Trapnell, 
Heine, Katz, Laveallee, & Lehman, 1996), followed by free response questions asking if 
they would have liked to add, remove, or change any of their listed self-aspects, and a 
demographic questionnaire. Finally, participants were presented with a debriefing form 
describing the study and a code to submit to MTurk in exchange for payment. Given that 
some participants listed more self-aspects than others and took longer to complete the 
survey, any participants who took longer than the estimated time were provided 
additional bonus payment (paid at an established hourly rate). 
Analysis plan. The primary analysis for this study sought to replicate results from 
McConnell et al., 2005. This study is exploratory in the sense that the a priori single best 
way to analyze the data was unknown. To enable experimentation with different analytic 
approaches without overfitting to the data, all of the analyses were first performed and 
refined on a “training” subset of the data (N = 491). Once the analyses were established 
and finalized on the training sample, they were applied and verified on a held out “test” 
sample of data (N = 298). Data from the entire sample were randomly assigned to either 
the training or test sample so as to avoid any systematic differences between the samples, 
with assignment stratified by the time 2 condition assignments (see Study 3) such that 
both conditions were represented equally in both the training and test sample. 
Conceptual replication was tested using the same metrics as reported in the 
original study (McConnell, 2005), including the calculation of the h-index (Scott, 1969), 
which weights both the number of self-aspects listed and the degree of overlap to 
measure self-complexity, as well as the correlation between the h-statistic and a number 
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of well-being measures. However, given that I decided to use a continuous scale rather 
than a categorical trait judgment (i.e., yes or no) to measure the relation of each trait to 
each self-aspect, trait judgments were transformed to a categorical scale for the 
calculation of the h-statistic. I used a variety of methods for doing so (e.g., rating 
threshold) in the training sample and applied only one to the test sample. The h-index that 
most closely replicated McConnell et al. (2005) was selected, while also considering the 
shape of the distribution and variance for each option. The selected transformation was 
then applied to the test sample, and the resulting mean self-complexity (h-index) scores, 
as well as their correlations with all of the well-being measures were calculated. To 
examine the role of affect in self-complexity, the correlation between mean overall self-
aspect positivity and the well-being measures was also examined. 
Results 
 I hypothesized that the mean number of self-aspects reported in McConnell 
(2011) and the mean self-complexity score reported in McConnell et al. (2005) would 
replicate, as would the correlations between the mean self-complexity score and the well-
being measures. On average, across the training and test sample combined, people 
reported having approximately 5 self-aspects (M = 4.92, SD =1.69), replicating results 
previous results.  
Iterative testing was run in the training data to evaluate different methods for 
binarizing the continuous scale trait ratings. This testing revealed that categorizing trait 
responses of 6 or 7 as “yes” and of 5 or lower as “no” fit the original results most closely 
(ratings were made on a 1-to-7 scale where 1 indicated “not at all” and 7 indicated “very 
much”). A one-sample t-test on the training data revealed that a threshold of 6 was the 
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only threshold that yielded an h-statistic (M = 2.34, SD = 0.80) that did not significantly 
differ from the h-statistic (M = 2.33, SD = 0.84) reported in McConnell et al. (2005) 
(t(490) = 0.54, p = .59). Moreover, the correlation values associated with this threshold in 
the training data were most similar in direction and magnitude to those reported in 
McConnell et al. (2005) (Table 1). Table 1 reveals that greater self-complexity in the 
training data (using an H-threshold of 6) was negatively correlated with positive markers 
of well-being, such as self-esteem (M = 30.94, SD = 6.84), and was positively correlated 
with negative markers of well-being, such as depression (M = 30.34, SD = 11.14) and 
perceived stress (M = 24.96, SD = 8.45). Notably, a threshold of 5 in the training data 
(not included in Table 1) yielded an h-statistic that actually correlated more strongly (in 
magnitude) with the well-being measures than the correlations reported in McConnell et 
al., 2005. However, given that the goal was to replicate McConnell et al (2005) as closely 
as possible and that a threshold of 6 was the only threshold to yield a similar h-statistic to 
that reported in McConnell et. al. (2005), a thresholding of 6 was selected for use in the 
test sample. 
The same analyses were run in the test sample using a threshold of 6 to calculate 
the h-statistic (i.e., self-complexity). A one-sample t-test comparing the mean h-statistic 
in the test sample (M = 2.32, SD = 0.82) to the mean h-statistic reported by McConnell et 
al. (2005) revealed no statistically significant difference (t(295) = -0.31, p = 0.76). 
Moreover, the correlation values associated with the h-index in test sample were, for the 
most part, similar in direction and magnitude as those reported in McConnell et al. (2005) 
(Table 1). Notably, greater self-aspect positivity was positively correlated with more 
desirable aspects of well-being such as self-esteem (M = 30.09, SD = 7.29) and 
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negatively correlated with less desirable elements of well-being such as depression (M = 
31.56, SD = 11.92), stress (M = 25.81, SD = 8.46), and physical symptoms (M = 52.26, 
SD = 19.88), as was also reported in McConnell et al., (2005) and the training data.   
 
 
Discussion 
 
I hypothesized that the findings of McConnell et al. (2005) would (conceptually) 
replicate such that greater self-complexity would correlate negatively with desirable well-
being measures (e.g., self-esteem) and positively with undesirable well-being measures 
(e.g., depression and stress). At a basic level, the mean number of self-aspects reported 
by participants in this online sample replicated the mean number reported in previous 
work (McConnell, 2011). Moreover, as expected, a calculation of self-complexity using 
established methods (h-index) replicated self-complexity values reported in McConnell et 
al., 2005. Not only did the self-complexity value replicate, but so did its correlation with 
Table 1        
Intercorrelations among self-complexity (H), self-aspect positivity (Pos.), and 
well-being measures from McConnell et al. (2005), Study 1 training data, and 
Study 1 test data  
 
McConnell et al. 
(2005) Study 1 (Train) Study 1 (Test) 
 
  H Pos. H Pos. H Pos.  
Self-complexity (H) -  -  -  
 
Self-aspect positivity -0.28** - -.12** - -.10 -  
Self-esteem -.16 .50** -.12** .49** -.07 .56**  
Depression .29** -.43** 0.23** -.39** 0.17** -.49**  
Physical Symptoms .23* -.24** .22** -.25** 0.16** -.26**  
Perceived Stress 0.1 -.19** .16** -.42** 0.14* -.49**  
Self-aspect negativity - - .26** -.82** 0.25** -.86**  
Self-aspect centrality - - -0.07 .57** -0.06 .65**  
Self-concept clarity - - -.18** .36** -.13* .49**  
Note. *p < .05, 
**p<.01.        
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well-being: greater self-complexity was negatively correlated with desirable well-being 
measures in the training sample (e.g., self-esteem) and positively correlated with 
undesirable well-being measures (e.g., depression, stress, and physical symptoms) in both 
the training and the test sample. The correlations within the training sample were similar 
in both strength and magnitude to those reported in McConnell et al., 2005, whereas 
those within the test sample were somewhat weaker. For example, although self-
complexity was significantly negatively correlated with self-aspect positivity in 
McConnell et al. (2005) and in the training sample, the negative correlation was not 
significant in the test sample. This lack of consensus between the training and test sample 
may partially be a testament to over-fitting in the training sample or to the smaller size of 
the test sample. It’s also possible that using another threshold to calculate self-complexity 
(e.g., defining a rating of 5 or more, rather than 6 or more, on a Likert scale rating as a 
“yes”) would have produced an h-index that correlated more strongly with the well-being 
measures, as was found in the training data. However, a threshold of 6 was selected to 
best replicate the findings reported in McConnell et al. (2005).    
 For the most part, these findings add credence to the claim that greater self-
complexity is negatively associated with well-being (Rafaeli-Mor & Steinberg, 2002). 
Although most empirical data suggest that greater self-complexity is negatively 
associated with well-being, support has been mixed due to competing evidence that 
greater self-complexity can also be positively associated with well-being. The data in this 
study supports the predominant claim, although the correlations were fairly small in 
magnitude. Self-aspect positivity, on the other hand, correlated much more strongly with 
the well-being measures, suggesting that some combination of self-complexity and self-
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aspect positivity may best predict well-being, a prediction in line with the spillover 
hypothesis (Linville, 1985). Future work could explore this idea further by examining the 
degree to which self-aspect positivity moderates the relationships between self-
complexity and well-being or the degree to which self-complexity predicts these well-
being measures above and beyond self-aspect positivity. However, the focus of the 
current study was not to clarify the relationship between self-complexity and well-being, 
but rather to use well-being as outcome variable for checking the effectiveness of the 
replication. 
An obvious limitation of the study is that the study only serves as a conceptual, 
rather than a direct, replication. In doing so, the study applies an old calculation (the h-
statistic) to a new method, in which participants are asked to rate self-aspects traits on 
matter of degree rather than sorting traits into distinct self-aspect categories. Saying that a 
trait describes a self-aspect as a “6” out of “7”, one could argue, is not psychologically 
the same as selecting a trait to be characteristic of a self-aspect in a card sort task. 
However, self-complexity, as calculated in this study, was only meant as an approximate 
replication of previous work, an interim step in the development of a new measure.  
It’s still worth considering, though, that the experience of completing this new, 
adapted, online version of the self-aspect task is psychologically different from 
completing the original card sort task. A traditional card sort task is a constructive, 
bottom-up process for determining the self-aspects that best describe an individual. The 
process often takes about 25 minutes (Showers, 1992), and self-aspect labels are not 
generated until after the traits are sorted. Alternatively, in this adapted version of the task, 
participants are asked to create their self-aspect labels before making trait ratings and are 
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only required to spend a short amount of time (2 minutes) doing so. Participants are then, 
somewhat tediously, asked to rate each self-aspect on every one of the possible traits, 
resulting in a less-deliberated and potentially less accurate set of ratings for each self-
aspect. To some extent, this task structure was merely a consequence of the available 
online methodologies. Future online tasks could conceivably use an online version of a 
card sort task before engaging in the trait ratings, but the optimal strategy for eliciting 
self-aspects remains to be determined. Regardless of any practical limitations, an online 
version of the self-aspect task has a number of possible implications for expanding the 
size and types of populations that can be studied. Making the measure broadly accessibly 
might also be an effective way to help individuals learn about themselves (e.g., via 
websites like MySocialBrain, https://mysocialbrain.org/).  
Future work developing the task for broader use may want to consider the trait 
words included in the task. The current study used the same list of traits as McConnell et 
al. 2005, a list of traits used as common self-descriptors amongst college students 
(Showers, 1992). However, because these traits serve as the basis for measuring self-
aspect overlap, the degree to which these trait words can accurately characterize a given 
self-aspect or the relationships between any given set of self-aspects, particularly outside 
of an academic community, should be examined. The nature of the relationships among 
the self-aspects - derived using the same traits words but analyzed using modern methods 
- is explored in Study 2. 
Study 2: Extension 
Method 
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Open science. The design, hypotheses, and analysis plan for this study were pre-
registered at the Open Science Framework (https://osf.io/t3hvj/). In this study, the results 
of Study 1 were extended to include novel network analysis techniques. Information 
about the participants, design, and procedures for this study are identical to those 
described in Study 1. 789 participants (403 female, Mage = 38.29, SD = 12.06) generated 
a list of their self-aspects and made trait ratings for each.  
Analysis plan. The primary analysis sought to replicate the results of Study 1 
using network analysis techniques. Trait ratings between each participant’s self-aspects 
were correlated to generate correlation matrices. The R package “qgraph” (Epskamp, 
Cramer, Waldrop, Schmittman, & Borsboom, 2012) used these correlation matrices to 
calculate centrality measures (strength, betweenness, closeness, and expected influence) 
for each self-aspect for each participant. Centrality values for each self-aspect were 
averaged for each person to create an overall centrality measure. Different measures of 
centrality and clustering were tested on the test sample. Measures of particular interest 
included mean strength (the mean weighted summation of absolute value edge lengths for 
each self-aspect), mean expected influence (the mean weighted summation of non-
absolute value edge lengths for each self-aspect), and mean closeness (the reciprocal of 
the sum of the shortest paths between each self-aspect and all other self-aspects). The 
measures that most closely replicated the results from Study 1 (determined through 
iterative testing) were selected, while also considering the shape of the distribution and 
the variance for each option. The selected network measures were then applied to the 
hold-out sample, and the resulting network metrics (i.e., centrality measures), as well as 
the correlation between those metrics and the well-being measures are reported.  
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Results 
I hypothesized that network metrics (e.g., centrality) would capture similar 
information about self-complexity as the h-statistic, while at the same time yielding more 
variance and thus more information to correlate with other psychological constructs (e.g., 
well-being measures). Different centrality measures were tested in the training sample 
before one was selected for use in the test sample. Figures 2 and 3 illustrate examples 
networks from participants who have high and low levels of centrality, respectively. 
 
Consistent with the theoretical assumptions of the multiple self-aspects 
framework, edge thresholding was set at zero to include all self-aspect correlations. Mean 
closeness (M = 0.20, SD = 0.15), strength (M = 2.50, SD = 1.40), and expected influence 
(M = 2.27, SD = 1.53) across the self-aspects for each participant from the training 
sample were selected for correlation with the h-index and the well-being measures from 
Study 1. Betweenness was eliminated as a possible metric in that it did not yield enough 
x = -4 z  = 23 
Figure 2. Example self-aspect network from a participant who has five self-aspects 
high in centrality. Green lines represent positive correlations, and the thick lines 
represent strong correlations between self-aspects. 
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variance (perhaps due to the small size of the networks). Other network-level metrics, 
such as clustering, were not ultimately tested given the relatively small size of the 
networks (although these metrics may be interesting for individuals with a higher number 
of self-aspects). 
 
Table 2 reveals that closeness was negatively correlated with strength and 
expected influence, which shared a strong positive correlation with one another. 
Closeness, strength, and expected influence correlated with the h-statistic to varying 
degrees. Even so, closeness, strength, and expected influence were positively correlated 
with self-positivity and self-esteem, and negatively correlated with depression, perceived 
stress, and physical symptoms. Expected influence demonstrated the overall strongest 
(highest magnitude) correlations with these well-being measures. 
Notably, an exploratory analysis revealed that the number of self-aspects did not 
significantly correlate with any of the well-being measures (Table 2), challenging 
x = -4 z  = 23 
Figure 3. Example self-aspect network from a participant who has five self-aspects 
lower in centrality. Green lines represent positive correlations, and red lines 
represent negative correlations. Thickness of the line indicates strength of the 
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previous assumptions that self-complexity should weight both the number of self-aspects 
as well as the degree of overlap in its calculation (at least for the purposes of correlating 
with well-being). To determine the effect of controlling for the number of self-aspects 
(n), a linear transformation (dividing by n-1) was applied to the expected influence 
measure for each individual, resulting in the equivalent of a mean distance calculation (M 
= .58, SD = .31). Indeed, this measure correlated even more strongly with the outcome 
measures, with higher mean distance correlating negatively and strongly with desirable 
well-being outcomes such as self-esteem and correlating positively and strongly with 
undesirable well-being outcomes such as depression and stress (Table 3). This result 
suggests that network measures predict outcomes of interest above and beyond simply the 
number of self-aspects in a network. Table 3 also reveals that mean distance was 
particularly strongly correlated with self-aspect positivity. However, a regression model 
indicated that mean distance significantly predicted measures like self-esteem (R2  change 
= 5.74% ; F(489) = 40.12, p <.001) and depression (R2  change = 7.61% ; F(489) = 86.64, 
p <.001) above and beyond self-aspect positivity. Therefore, mean distance was selected 
as the centrality measure of interest for examination in the test sample.  
Mean distance calculated for each participant in the test sample (M = .56, SD = 
.32) was correlated with the h-index and the well-being measures from Study 1 (Table 4). 
Like in the training sample, mean distance was negatively correlated with the h-index, 
strongly positively correlated with desirable well-being measures like self-esteem and 
strongly negatively correlated with undesirable well-being measures like depression, 
physical symptoms, and stress. Notably, mean distance was particularly strongly 
positively correlated with self-complexity, but a regression model revealed, once again, 
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that mean distance significantly predicted well-being measures like self-esteem (R2  
change = 7.93%, F(296) = 38.38, p <.001) and depression (R2  change = 8.34%, F(297) = 
91.88, p <.001) above and beyond self-aspect positivity. 
Table 2   
Intercorrelations among number of self-aspects and well-being measures 
from Study 2 training data 
  No. Self-Aspects 
Self-aspect positivity 0.03 
Self-esteem 0.07 
Depression 0.01 
Physical Symptoms 0.05 
Perceived Stress -0.04 
Self-aspect 
negativity 0.03 
Self-aspect centrality 0.04 
Self-concept clarity -0.01 
Note. *p < .05, **p<.01.  
 
 
Table 3       
Intercorrelations among self-complexity (H), centrality measures, and well-being 
measures from Study 2 training data 
 Zero-order correlations 
  Closeness Strength 
Expected 
Influence 
Mean 
Distance H 
Centrality: Closeness -     
Centrality: Strength -.23**     
Centrality: Influence -.12** .94** -   
Centrality: Distance .44** .54** .72** -   
Self-complexity (H) -.54** .20** 0.07 -.30** - 
Self-aspect positivity .19** .40** .51** .63** -.12** 
Self-esteem 0.09 .34** .43** .50** -.12** 
Depression -.12** -.26** -.36** -0.46** 0.23** 
Physical Symptoms -.11* -.21** -.25** -.35** .22** 
Perceived Stress -.10* -.31** -.39** -.46** .16** 
Self-aspect negativity -.24** -.40** -.52** -.67** .26** 
Self-aspect centrality .25** .33** .38** .72** -0.07 
Self-concept clarity .15** .28** .36** .47** -.18** 
Note. *p < .05, **p<.01.      
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Discussion 
 
 I hypothesized that the findings of Study 1, in which greater self-complexity was 
negatively correlated with desirable measures of well-being and positively correlated 
with undesirable measure of well-being, could also be replicated using network-based 
approaches. Indeed, mean centrality measures across self-aspects, including mean 
closeness, mean strength, and mean expected influence within the training data all 
exhibited this pattern (although notably, because of the way that these measures are 
calculated, the direction of the patterns were reversed such that higher centrality, or more 
overlap, was associated with more well-being). Mean strength and expected influence 
correlated more strongly with well-being measures than closeness as a result of the way 
they weighted information about the number of self-aspects. Mean strength and mean 
expected influence also correlated more strongly with well-being measures than the h-
Table 4     
Intercorrelations Among Self-Complexity (H), Centrality Measures, and Well-Being 
Measures from Study 2 Test Data 
 Zero-order correlations 
  Mean Distance H Pos. 
Self-complexity (H) -.20** - - 
Self-aspect positivity .70** -.12** - 
Self-esteem .59** -.12** .56** 
Depression -.55** 0.23** -.49** 
Physical Symptoms -.37** .22** -.26** 
Perceived Stress -.54** .16** -.49** 
Self-aspect negativity -.70** .26** -.86** 
Self-aspect centrality .50** -0.07 .65** 
Self-concept clarity .53** -.18** .49** 
Note. *p < .05, **p<.01.     
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statistic, suggesting these measures capture meaningful information that h-statistic does 
not, at least with regards to well-being. 
Interestingly, the number of self-aspects did not correlate with these well-being 
measures, indicating that a novel measure (at least one optimized for correlating with 
well-being) need not incorporate the number of self-aspects. As a result, average path 
length (mean distance), which averages out information about the number of self-aspects, 
was selected as an optimal measure for this analysis, and, as predicted, correlated most 
strongly with well-being measures. Moreover, despite the fact that average path length 
(mean distance) was strongly correlated with self-aspect positivity, it contributed unique 
information for predicting the well-being measures above and beyond self-aspect 
positivity. 
Overall, then, the selected measure of interest in this study, the mean distance, 
seems to capture important information about the relationships between people’s different 
self-aspects (and not about the number of self-aspects). The information that is captured 
seems to be highly related to well-being, such that individuals with higher scores (i.e., 
more integrated self-aspects), report experiencing more well-being. The measure is also 
strongly related to self-aspect positivity, but captures additional information beyond 
positivity.  
These findings highlight the ability of network metrics to capture important 
information and extend the previous literature in a number of meaningful ways. Whereas 
previous calculations of self-complexity (using the h-statistic) have weighted both the 
number of self-aspects and their overlap as important factors for characterizing self-
complexity, the literature has not yet had the tools available to determine which of these 
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component factors is related to well-being. Of course, the number of self-aspects might 
be meaningful for relationships with other variables, beyond well-being. The beauty of a 
network approach, though, is that different network metrics can be pulled from the 
network depending on the question of interest. For example, although the current study 
was interested in pulling a single network-level metric of integration to correlate with 
measures related to well-being, another study may simply be interested in pulling node-
level information about an individual’s “work self” and “home self” to examine 
relationships between these self-aspects and outcomes related to productivity and time 
management.  
 Although it’s possible that the number of listed self-aspects may matter in other 
contexts, it’s important to think about why they did not matter here. At the start of the 
task, participants are asked to provide anywhere from 2 to 8 self-aspects, and it’s possible 
that participants choose the number of self-aspects that they would like to list somewhat 
arbitrarily. Whether two self-aspects are deemed to be one and the same is a rather 
subjective and arbitrary decision. For example, someone could choose to either list their 
“wife” and “mother” self-aspects separately or to lump them together as a “family” self-
aspect. While more meaningful information may be obtained from listing the self-aspects 
separately, it may not make sense to call this person more complex simply for listing 
more aspects. In other words, the number of self-aspects may not provide as much 
meaningful information as the relationships between them. The role of the number of 
self-aspects will need to be further examined, but if, in fact, the number of self-aspects 
does not matter in meaningful ways, this finding would have a number of important 
implications for psychologists. First, this finding would lend more support to the idea that 
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psychologists studying the structure of self-aspects should move away from using 
measures like the h-index that are driven in part by number of self-aspects and towards a 
measure that is agnostic to them. Moreover, finding that the number of self-aspects does 
not matter would allow the number of self-aspects to be set across participants in future 
work without losing much meaningful information. Controlling for the number of self-
aspects (and perhaps even content) would allow for much tighter comparisons across 
participants without needing to control for the number of self-aspects listed.  
 Given that the perceived similarity between the self-aspects (i.e., the degree to 
which participants rated self-aspects similarly across the traits), rather than the number of 
self-aspects listed, seems to be predictive of well-being, it’s worth thinking about the type 
of information that this measure captures. For example, integration might, to a large 
degree, capture positive information about the self-aspects. Based on the spillover 
hypothesis (Linville, 1985), positive self-aspects are more likely to integrate, whereas 
negative self-aspects are more likely to disperse. However, despite the strong correlation 
between integration (mean distance) and positivity, integration predicted measures of 
well-being above and beyond positivity. In fact, the same results hold when negativity is 
added to the model. Thus, integration must have some other non-affectively based effect 
(e.g., inducing a feeling of wholeness or a feeling of control) that future work may want 
to investigate. 
 
Of course, although the present study was limited to primarily examining the 
association between self-complexity and well-being, well-being is not the only outcome 
of interest. Self-complexity may be related to a whole other suite of processes. For 
example, the results from this study indicate that integration is positively related to self-
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concept clarity, and it’s possible that integration is associated with other identity-based 
individual difference measures. The variance for the centrality measures was relatively 
high, increasing the likelihood that these measures will correlate with other potential 
measures of interest. 
The study was also limited in that the selected centrality measure, mean distance, 
only yields one number, essentially a mean correlation value across all self-aspects, for 
the entire network, washing out a lot of potentially important information about the 
relationships between the self-aspects. Specifically, the same integration value (mean 
distance)  might differ in meaningful different ways across two individuals. While one 
person may have consistently moderate interactions between all of their self-aspects, 
another may have a few very strong connections in combination with a number of weak, 
or even negative correlations, averaging out to an overall moderate level of integration. 
These two very different structures might, however, yield two very different relationships 
with well-being or might be very differentially influenced by interventions. The strength 
of a network-based approach is that it is well-suited to address these types of questions, 
even though they were not directly addressed here. Study 3 addresses some of these 
question by investigating the consistency of integration over time, as well as its 
susceptibility to manipulation / intervention. 
Study 3: Manipulation 
Method 
Open science. The design, hypotheses, and analysis plan for this study were pre-
registered at the Open Science Framework (https://osf.io/t3hvj/).  
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Participants. Three weeks after participation, the same 789 participants from 
Study 1 were invited to participate in a 30-minute online follow-up study using 
TurkPrime’s data acquisition platform (Litman, Robinson, & Abberbock, 2017). 
Participants were excluded if they did not complete the survey (either voluntarily or for 
failing an initial attention check), or failed either of two other attention checks included 
in the survey. The final sample for analysis included 520 participants (275 female, Mage 
= 38.89, SD = 12.10). 
Design. Participants were randomly assigned to one of two writing conditions 
(integration or control) before completing the trait ratings for their self-aspects, yielding a 
mixed within (time), between (condition) subjects design. 
Procedures. After consenting, participants were randomly assigned to one of two 
conditions that both involved a writing task. In the experimental condition, participants 
wrote about the ways in which their different self-aspects (generated in the first session 
and provided to them in a listed format here) come together and fit with one another to 
form their overall identity. To clarify the instructions, participants in both conditions 
were presented with example writing responses for another individual (Harry Potter). In 
the control condition, participants wrote about the details of their typical day. Writing 
about a typical day has been used as a control condition in other writing manipulations 
(e.g., Peters, Flink, Boersma, & Linton, 2010) because it controls for writing and self-
focus but does not induce the specific kind of self-focused thought as the experimental 
condition. Participants were required to brainstorm about their prompt for at least one 
minute and to write for at least 5 minutes. Moreover, participants were required to write 
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at least 100 words before proceeding to the next section (examples responses from 
participants in each condition are included in Appendix B) 
Afterwards, participants were provided with a list of the self-aspects they had 
generated in the first session and completed trait-level and overall-level ratings for each 
self-aspect that they listed in Study 1. Participants were asked “to what extent does the 
following word describe your _______ self-aspect?” (1 = not at all to 7 = very much) for 
the same 40 trait words used in Study 1. Presentation of the questions was blocked so that 
participants answered all 40 questions for one self-aspect before moving on to the next 
self-aspect, with order of self-aspect blocks randomized. At the end of each block, 
participants were asked three additional questions about overall centrality, positivity, and 
negativity for each self-aspect.  
At the end of the survey, participants completed a post-questionnaire in which 
they indicated whether the self-aspects they saw in this study were the same self-aspects 
they listed in Study 1 (yes, no, and not sure), and provided some free responses indicating 
whether they would change any of the self-aspects they had originally listed, remove any 
of the self-aspects they had originally listed, or add any new self-aspects. Upon 
completion, participants were presented with a debriefing form describing the study and a 
code to submit to MTurk in exchange for payment. Given that some participants listed 
more self-aspects than average and took longer to complete the survey, participants who 
took longer than the estimated time were provided additional bonus payment for their 
time (based on the same hourly rate). 
Analysis plan. The primary analyses investigated the effects of time and 
manipulation. A mixed factorial ANOVA was run in order to determine main effects of 
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time and of manipulation, as well as their interaction, with follow up contrasts to clarify 
any effects. Follow up contrasts examining changes from time 1 to time 2 in the control 
condition and examining differences between the control and integration condition at 
time 2 were of particular (a priori) interest. The same analyses were run using the h-
statistic, centrality measures, mean overall self-reported centrality, mean overall self-
reported positivity, and mean overall self-reported negativity as dependent measures.  
Results 
Based on the efficacy of previous self-based writing manipulations, I 
hypothesized that the writing manipulation would change the way that individuals 
perceive themselves, and that network metrics would be particularly sensitive to these 
changes. Moreover, based on findings in the personality literature that self-reported 
personality items should remain consistent over time, particularly over the short time 
period of a few weeks (e.g., Caspi, Roberts, & Shiner, 2004), I hypothesized that no 
significant differences in self-complexity (as measured by the h-statistic or by network 
metrics) would be observed between time 1 and time 2 for those participants in the 
control condition.  
Self-complexity (h). A mixed factorial ANOVA investigating self-complexity, as 
measured by the h-index, revealed a significant main effect of time (F(1, 518) = 13.61, p 
< .001), such that self-complexity decreased from time 1 (M = 2.33, SD = .79) to time 2 
(M = 2.25, SD = .80) across both conditions, but revealed no significant main effect of 
condition (F(1, 518) = .08, p = .78) and no significant interaction (F(1, 518) = 0.53, p  = 
.47).  
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Follow-up contrasts examining the main effect of time revealed that the h-statistic 
(i.e., self-complexity) decreased in both the control (time 1 M = 2.32, SD = .74;  time 2 M 
= 2.23, SD = .79; t(259) = -3.37, p < .001) and experimental groups (time 1 M = 2.33, SD 
= .83; time 2 M = 2.26, SD = .82; t(259) = -1.96, p = .05). Contrasts comparing 
differences in the integration condition (M = 2.33, SD = .83) and the control condition (M 
= 2.32, SD = .74) at time 1 (t(518) = -.03, p = .98) and the integration condition (M = 
2.26, SD = .82) and the control condition (M = 2.23, SD = .79) at time 2 (t(518) = -.48, p 
= .63) were not significant. 
Centrality (mean distance). A mixed factorial ANOVA investigating the 
primary centrality measure of interest (mean distance) revealed a significant main effect 
of time, such that centrality increased from time 1 (M = .59, SD = .31) to time 2 (M = .61, 
SD = .31; F(1, 518) = 5.14, p = .02) overall. There was no significant main effect of 
condition (F(1, 518) = .12, p = .73) and no significant interaction (F(1, 518) = 0.53, p  = 
.47).  
Follow-up contrasts examining the main effect of time revealed that centrality 
increased in the experimental condition (time 1 M = .59, SD = .31; time 2 M = .62, SD = 
.31; t(259) = 2.81, p < .01) but not the control condition (time 1 M = .59, SD = .30; time 2 
M = .60, SD = .32; t(259) = .60, p = .54). Figure 4 illustrates network graphs for a 
participant who increased in mean distance from time 1 to time 2. Contrasts comparing 
differences in the integration condition (M = .59, SD = .31) and the control condition (M 
= .59, SD = .30) at time 1 (t(518) = .06, p = .95) and the integration condition (M = .62, 
SD = .31) and the control condition (M = .60, SD = .32) at time 2 (t(518) = -.73, p = .47) 
were not significant. 
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Centrality (expected influence). A mixed factorial ANOVA investigating a 
secondary centrality measure (mean expected influence) revealed a significant main 
effect of time such that self-complexity increased in general (time 1 M = 2.28, SD = 1.52; 
time 2 M = 2.36, SD = 1.56; F(1, 518) = 5.14, p < .05), but there was no significant main 
effect of condition (F(1, 518) = .12, p = .73) and no significant interaction (F(1, 518) = 
0.53, p  = .47). 
 Follow-up contrasts unpacking the main effect of time revealed that expected 
influence increased over time in the experimental group (time 1 M = 2.28, SD = 1.46; 
time 2 M = 2.39, SD = 1.52; (t(259) = 3.14, p < .01) but not in the control group (time 1 
M = 2.29, SD = 1.57 ; time 2 M = 2.33, SD = 1.61; t(259) = .93, p =.36). Contrasts 
comparing differences in the integration condition (M = 2.28, SD = 1.46) and the control 
condition (M = 2.29, SD = 1.57) at time 1 (t(518) = .12, p = .90) and the integration 
condition (M = 2.39, SD = 1.52) and the control condition (M = 2.33, SD = 1.61) at time 2 
(t(518) = -.38, p = .70) were not significant. 
x = -4 z  = 23 
Figure 4. Example self-aspect networks from a participant who listed four self-aspects 
and who increased in mean distance from time 1 (left, distance = .17) to time 2 (right, 
distance = .54). Green lines represent positive correlations, and red lines represent 
negative correlations. Thickness of the line indicates strength of the relationship. 
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Self-reported centrality. A mixed factorial ANOVA investigating self-reported 
self-aspect centrality revealed no significant main effect of time (F(1, 518) = 2.44, p =. 
12), no significant main effect of condition (F(1, 518) = 1.92, p = .26), and no significant 
interaction (F(1, 518) = 1.85, p  = .18). 
Follow-up contrasts (for consistency) revealed that mean self-reported self-aspect 
centrality did not change over time in the experimental group (time 1 M = 5.55, SD = .91; 
M = 5.54, SD = .90) (t(259) = -.15, p = .88), although showed a trending but non-
significant (Bonferonni-corrected) decrease in the control group (time 1 M = 5.68, SD = 
.95; time 2 M = 5.59, SD = 1.02) (t(259) = -2.03, p = .04). Contrasts comparing 
differences in the integration condition (M = 5.55, SD = .91) and the control condition (M 
= 5.68, SD = .95) at time 1 (t(518) = 1.60, p = .11) and the integration condition (M = 
5.54, SD = .90) and the control condition (M = 5.59, SD = 1.02) at time 2 (t(518) = .48, p 
= .63) were not significant. 
Self-aspect positivity. A mixed factorial ANOVA investigating mean self-
reported self-aspect positivity revealed no significant main effect of time (F(1, 518) = 
.27, p = .61), no significant main effect of condition (F(1, 518) = .06, p = .81), but did 
reveal a significant interaction (F(1, 518) = 6.10, p  < .05) (Figure 5). 
Follow-up contrasts examining the interaction revealed a cross-over effect such 
that self-reported self-aspect positivity increased (non-significantly) in the integration 
group (time 1 M = 5.80, SD = .95; M = 5.86, SD = 1.00) (t(259) = 1.45, p = .15), and 
showed a trending but non-significant (Bonferonni-corrected) decrease in the control 
group (time 1 M = 5.89, SD = 1.03, time 2 M = 5.81, SD = 1.03) (t(259) = -2.02, p = .04). 
Contrasts comparing differences in the integration condition (M = 5.80, SD = .95) and the 
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control condition (M = 5.89, SD = 1.03) at time 1 (t(518) = .97, p = .33) and the 
integration condition (M = 5.86, SD = 1.00) and the control condition (M = 5.81, SD = 
1.03) at time 2 (t(518) = -.49, p = .62) were not significant. 
 
  
 Self-aspect negativity. A mixed factorial ANOVA investigating mean self-
reported self-aspect negativity revealed no significant main effect of time F(1, 518) = .16, 
p = .69, no significant main effect of condition (F(1, 518) = .64, p = .42), and no 
significant interaction (F(1, 518) = 0.18, p  = .69). 
Follow-up contrasts examining the interaction revealed a cross-over effect such 
that self-reported self-aspect negativity did not change in the integration group (time 1 M 
= 1.98, SD = .98; M = 1.96, SD = 1.02) (t(259) = -.63, p = .53) or in the control group 
(time 1 M = 2.04, SD = 1.09, time 2 M = 2.04, SD = 1.09) (t(259) = .02, p = .98). 
Contrasts comparing differences in the integration condition (M = 1.98, SD = .98) and the 
Figure 5. Interaction effect for self-aspect positivity across time for 
the two conditions (control and self-integration).  
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control condition (M = 2.04, SD= 1.09) at time 1 (t(518) = .64, p = .52) and the 
integration condition (M = 1.96, SD = 1.02) and the control condition (M = 2.04, SD = 
1.09) at time 2 (t(518) = .88, p = .38) were not significant. 
Discussion 
 
I hypothesized that a self-integration manipulation would lead to increases in 
measures of self-complexity and centrality compared to a control condition. I tested this 
prediction across two studies using different operationalizations, with self-complexity 
indexed by the h-index in Study 1 and centrality by mean distance and expected influence 
in Study 2. For exploratory purposes, the effects of the manipulations on self-aspect 
positivity, negativity, and self-reported centrality were also investigated. A change over 
time was found for both self-complexity and centrality such that, surprisingly, self-
complexity significantly decreased in the control condition and, less surprisingly, 
centrality significantly increased for the integration condition. Moreover, self-aspect 
positivity decreased for the control condition but increased for the integration condition, 
suggesting a possible mechanism for the effects on self-complexity and centrality 
reported above. Although these findings were, for the most part, in line with the 
hypothesis, they were not found in the predicted ways (e.g., although the integration 
condition changed across time, it was not significantly different from the control 
condition).  
 The somewhat similar findings for self-complexity (using the h-statistic) and 
complexity (using network-based approached) lend credence to the idea that both are, to 
some extent, measuring similar information, although it’s unclear which is more reliable 
for detecting the effects of intervention. Notably, the change over time for self-
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complexity was driven by the control condition, whereas the change over time for 
centrality was driven by the integration condition, suggesting that the two measures are 
capturing different types of information, likely as a result of the way they deal with self-
aspects or counting responses (as binary or as a matter of degree). Network approaches 
have the overall advantage of being more flexible, calculating metrics differently based 
on the needs of the question, but the best measure for capturing changes over time has yet 
to be determined, as mean distance and expected influence were optimized for correlation 
with well-being measures, not detecting change over time.  
 The interaction effect for positivity suggests that affect may play an important 
role in self-complexity changes. In this case, integration promoted increases in positivity 
for the self-aspect ratings, whereas the control condition promoted decreases in positivity 
for the self-aspect ratings. Based on these results, it’s possible that thinking about the 
ways that selves come together can be affirming or mood-boosting, in some way. Indeed, 
the integration manipulation was a new manipulation designed for this particular study, 
and any underlying mechanisms for engaging in the task are unknown. Similarly, 
although the control condition was intended to be neutral, it’s possible that thinking about 
more typical elements of one’s life could be somewhat mood deflating.  
 Although the results hint that the integration manipulation may lead to (small) 
changes in the relationships between self-aspects, the fact that both conditions led to 
changes on measures of either self-complexity or self-integration suggests that self-
aspects, regardless of any manipulation, change over time. In other words, the effects of 
life, itself, may change self-aspect ratings more so than the effect of a 5-minute writing 
exercise. Still interesting is the idea that self-aspect ratings changed in similar directions 
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across participants, in favor of decreased complexity and higher integration. In this sense, 
it’s possible that the first session actually served as a longer-lasting manipulation, 
priming participants to start thinking about their self-aspects over the next 3 weeks in 
ways they had not thought of them before, or perhaps simply inducing some sort of 
habituation at time 2. These possible reasons for the change observed are entirely 
speculative. Regardless of the underlying reasons, though, it is worth underscoring that 
the relationships between people’s self-aspects did significantly change over time, 
whereas no change would have been expected by chance. 
 That said, the integration manipulation was limited in a number of ways. First, 
although the manipulation was grounded in previous literature, the integration 
manipulation was a new manipulation designed for the purposes of this study. Other more 
established manipulations could have been more effective at manipulating self-
integration, and those aimed at decreasing rather than increasing integration should be 
explored in future work. Even so, this particular manipulation was chosen to avoid any 
potential third variables associated with other, established manipulations. The goal of the 
present study was to increase self-integration, and so a manipulation asking participants 
to list the ways that their self-aspects are integrated was developed. An advantage of this 
approach is that it avoids certain questions about the mechanisms underlying the 
intervention. However, a potential disadvantage of the approach is that there may have 
been certain demands characteristics in telling people to write about their integrated self-
aspects and then having them rate the degree of integration amongst their self-aspects. 
Given that integration was not directly measured (only trait ratings), it is not expected 
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that any demand characteristics would have been obvious to the participants, but the 
limitation is still worth considering. 
 Even so, the finding that identity changes across both conditions holds 
implications, both for the broader literature on identity change (e.g., Caspi, Roberts & 
Shiner, 2005) as well as for future intervention-based work. Because identity is usually 
deemed to be stable, evidence of identity-based changes lends support to the idea that 
identity can be used as a target for intervention. Whereas transformative life events are 
“special” in that they yield quick, large-scale changes in identity (McAdams, 2008; 
McAdams & Guo, 2015), intervention may be able to achieve similar effects through 
smaller-scale, sustained changes. Future work will need to not only explore other 
interventions that might lead to change in self-complexity, but also examine the degree to 
which these types of self-complexity interventions are long-lasting over time. The 
network methods examined in this study provide one potential method for measuring 
those changes, as well as for comparing the mechanisms underlying existing, self-based 
manipulations (e.g., self-distancing, self-affirmation, self-compassion).   
 As part of this network-based approach, future work will also be able to consider 
the more nuanced relationships between self-aspects. Although a measure of overall 
integration may capture important information about a person, as a whole, it may not be 
the most important level at which to measure the relationships between self-aspects in the 
case of interventions. Rather than targeting the self as a whole, interventions may want to 
target particular self-aspects, for example, by integrating a self that does not correlate 
strongly with the rest of the self-aspects. Future work should consider the content of the 
particular self-aspects listed (e.g., using a factor analysis) and the effects that 
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manipulations have on particular self-aspect relationships, a relationship that would 
become easier to examine in the case of standardizing self-aspects across participants. 
General Discussion 
Knowns 
Through a series of experiments, this paper replicated the relation between 
previously established self-complexity measures and well-being, extended these 
measures to the domain of network analysis, and showed that these measures of self-
complexity change over time. Although conclusions regarding the relationship between 
self-complexity and well-being in the literature have been mixed, the strength of the 
correlations between self-complexity and well-being measure found in this large sample 
of data supports the idea that individuals with lower self-complexity tend to experience 
better well-being. Importantly, network measures of self-complexity were, by a large 
margin, able to explain even more of the variance in well-being, further supporting the 
idea that individuals with lower self-complexity tend to experience better well-being and 
demonstrating one way in which network approaches can reveal important information 
about the structure of the self. Lastly, although no one manipulation yielded more change 
in self-complexity over time, overall change in self-complexity across time was found 
using a number of measures. The knowledge that change is possible will be informative 
for future interventions that aim to directly manipulate self-complexity.     
Unknowns and Future Directions 
Together, these known findings evoke broader questions about the nature of the 
self and highlight the continued need to develop tools for measuring self and identity. 
First, the findings evoke broader questions about the nature of the self and whether or not 
people can be said to have one self or many. Simply because individuals are able to 
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report multiple important self-aspects does not mean that they perceive themselves this 
way on a daily basis. Rather, the task required that participants list more than one self, 
and many participants may have simply been meeting these task demands. However, it is 
likely that some individuals do experience having multiple selves, and yet this does not 
mean that they do not also have a single, unified sense of self. Indeed, these self-aspects 
were, on average, fairly strongly positively correlated with one another, indicating some 
sort of unity amongst them. Rather than asking whether participants are able to hold both 
self-perspectives, though, research in the field asks how individuals are able to maintain 
both multiple self-aspects and a unified sense of self (Roberts & Donahue, 1994). 
Whether these individual self-aspects can be said to comprise that same overall sense of 
self or whether the sense of self is something entirely different remains a philosophical 
question. 
Second, the findings evoke broader questions about identity change (explored 
more in Chapter 3). Researchers examining life narrative acknowledge that the types of 
transformative life events that change the way individuals talk about themselves occur, 
by definition, infrequently over the course of a lifetime (McAdams, 2008; McAdams & 
Guo, 2015). Moreover, personality researchers note that an individual’s identity-defining 
traits can change, but that these types of changes occur over the course of decades. To 
what extent, then, can a brief intervention or manipulation be said to lead to any form of 
identity change, and do significant changes in calculated self-complexity or centrality 
qualify as identity change? These questions, too, are philosophical in nature, but the 
answers have the potential to inform directions for future research. For example, rather 
than attempting to manipulate identity in small ways, researchers might try calculating 
  
 
54
changes in self-complexity and centrality reported by individuals experiencing 
transformative life events. 
Finally, the findings provoke a broader call towards the development of methods 
for studying the self. Although network-based behavioral approaches provide a novel 
method for investigating questions about the structure of the self, this method will need to 
be validated against other measures. Of particular interest are measures that are able to 
better clarify the broad mechanisms underlying self-complexity and the multiple self-
aspects framework. For example, it is currently unclear whether each self-aspect takes up 
a separate cognitive “workspace” that becomes differentially activated, or whether each 
self-aspect “comes online” in a shared self-processing workspace, a la the working self-
concept (Markus & Kunda, 1986). Neuroimaging provides a valuable tool for not only 
answering these more process-based questions at the neural level, but also for answering 
these questions at the psychological level (Berridge, 1995), and is anticipated to be 
informative in both ways here, as well. The first step to addressing this more process-
based question is to simply understand how multiple self-aspects are represented at a 
neural level. Although traditional studies investigating neuroscience of the self have 
applied univariate metrics to identify brain regions that are involved in tracking self-
referential information more broadly (Kelley et al., 2002; Moore, Merchant, Kahn, & 
Pfeifer, 2014), more nuanced brain decoding techniques have shown that refinement 
within these regions is possible (e.g., Chavez, Heatherton, & Wagner, 2016; 
Yankouskaya, Humphreys, Stolte, Stokes, Moradi, & Sui, 2017). Determining the extent 
to which similar decoding techniques detect multiple self-aspects within pre-identified 
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regions of interest (e.g., vmPFC) and align with the behavioral network metrics describe 
above is a promising next direction. 
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CHAPTER III 
PERSONAL IDENTITY AND THE MORAL SELF 
 
What is Personal Identity? 
 Imagine a person, “J,” who lives in the Pacific Northwest, has an affinity for 
outdoor activities, tends to be introverted, and has unwavering interest in the self. Fast 
forward 30 years to a scene in which J still lives in the Pacific Northwest, hikes when she 
can, still lives a relatively quiet life, but no longer studies the self in any way, shape, or 
form. Is “J” the same person she was 30 years ago?  
The study of personal identity has historically centered around these and other 
related questions concerning the continuity of self over time and the qualities of self that 
determine that continuity. Philosophical perspectives on this line of work have varied, 
ranging from Hume, who somewhat mindfully argued that because the self is derived 
from fleeting “impressions,” there is no way for the self to be persistent through time 
(1738/1978), to Parfit who invokes images of amoeba-like selves and tele transportation 
to Mars to argue that connectedness amongst selves is only possible as a matter of degree 
(1971). Albeit insightful, these topics entertained by Hume and Parfit, do not say much 
about who “J” is. Rather, these perspectives primarily fall under the branch of personal 
identity known as re-identification, which aims to characterize the type of subject that can 
track persistence over time (Schechtman, 1996) and is primarily of sole interest to 
philosophers. 
The concept of re-identification (described above) stands in subtle contrast to the 
concept of categorization, which, rather than characterizing the subjects that track persist 
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over time, aims to identify the content that is essential to the persistence of these subjects 
over time (Schechtman, 1996). For example, John Locke famously espoused that 
psychological continuity is at the heart of personal identity, claiming that elements of 
consciousness, and particularly memory, are required to deem a person the same from 
time 1 to time 2 (Locke, 1690/2009). According to Locke, “J” would still be the same 
person in 30 years so long as she remembered that she once had a passion for studying 
the self, and, under this argument, it could be said that memories are “essential” to who J 
is. However, if “J” were instead perceived to be a different person in 30 years because of 
her lost interest in the self, then her interest in the self, rather than her memories, would 
be deemed a more essential part of her identity. Given the types of conclusions drawn 
from these types of thought experiments about the relative importance of certain content 
to identity, this branch of personal identity concerned with categorization has a number of 
important implications for psychologists. 
Even so, psychologists have not traditionally considered the types of claims and 
arguments provided by philosophers in this domain. Rather, psychologists have 
traditionally used the term “personal identity” to reference the ways in which individuals 
characterize themselves as distinct from other individuals (Olson, 2016). This type of 
personal identity has also been called “synchronic personal identity,” that domain of 
personal identity focused on identifying the traits and roles that characterize someone at a 
particular time. In the case of “J,” a psychologist would reference all of “J’s” qualities, 
including her identity as a Pacific Northwesterner, as an outdoorswoman, as an introvert, 
and as a researcher interested in the self to describe J’s personal identity.  
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As a result, the majority of empirical attention has been dedicated towards 
understanding this synchronic element of self, to the exclusion of the “diachronic” self, or 
the self that persists over time (Northoff, 2017). The diachronic self has been almost 
entirely overlooked by researchers despite its clear importance to how people think about 
themselves and others. Of course, studies investigating elements of mental time travel 
(Schachter, Addis, Hassabis, Martin, Spreng, & Szpunar, 2012) and child development 
(Pfeifer et al., 2013)  come close to addressing important elements of self-continuity, but 
none of the paradigms used in these studies have directly considered those core elements 
of personal identity that persist over time.  
The study of self as narrative gets close and has even been argued to comprise the 
core of who we are (Dennett, 1992), but philosophers have pointed out that there is a 
difference between the narrative self and personal identity. Whereas narrative is a 
collection of the identities that one possesses, personal identity references the core 
subject that possesses all of those identities (Peacocke, 2014). Narrative “J” would be the 
person who possesses the consistent identities over time (the Pacific Northwesterner, the 
outdoorswoman, and the introvert), whereas arguments from personal identity would say 
that “J,” at her core, is a person who researches the self because she deems herself a 
different person otherwise.  
All of these perspectives on personal identity provide valuable information in the 
pursuit of effectively characterizing and understanding an individual. Whereas some 
perspectives, such as the traditional psychological perspective, have long been a topic of 
thorough empirical scrutiny, other perspectives, such as the traditional philosophical 
perspective, have not. That said, understanding the content that is at the core of 
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someone’s identity is invaluable for fully understanding that person. Here, I focus on the 
empirical investigation of personal identity as traditionally defined in the philosophical 
tradition; in particular, I focus on the approach of categorization that attempts to identify 
the content that is essential to a person. 
What Elements of Identity Are Essential? 
 Empirical philosophers have started identifying the content that is essential to a 
person by gathering lay perceptions on the matter. Original experiments utilized body-
switched scenarios in order to test folk intuitions about identity. Blok, Newman, and Rips 
(2005) asked participants to imagine that the brain of one person (“J”) had been placed 
into the body of another person. In one scenario, memories are not preserved such that J, 
despite maintaining her cognitive faculties, does not remember who she is when in the 
other body. In another, memories are preserved, such that she does remember who she is. 
People tend to agree that J is the same person only when memories are preserved, an 
effect that has been replicated across a variety of scenarios (Nichols & Bruno, 2010), 
supporting the conclusions of many philosophers dating back to Locke. 
 However, the notion that memories are most core to who we are has recently been 
challenged. Strohminger & Nichols (2014) asked participants to imagine a variety of 
science-fiction-like examples in which one part of someone changes, but everything else 
remains the same. For example, participants were told to imagine that someone had taken 
a pill that would selectively change only one part of that person’s mind but nothing else 
and were then asked to indicate the degree to which that someone would be a different 
person given a particular change. Across five separate studies, more than changes to 
perceptions (e.g., ability to feel pain), desires (e.g., enjoyment of a favorite food), 
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memories (e.g., cherished memories of time spent with parents) and personality (e.g., 
industrious), changes to morality (e.g., honesty) yielded most perceived change, to a 
relatively strong degree. 
 This “moral self effect” has since been replicated across a variety of studies (e.g., 
Heiphetz, Strohminger & Young, 2017; Everett, Skorburg, Livingston, Chituc, & 
Crockett, under review), including evidence indicating that the effect holds even in the 
real world (Strohminger & Nichols, 2015) and across different cultures (Garfield, 
Nichols, Rai, & Strohminger, 2015). Moreover, the finding that morality is core to who 
we are is consistent with work in separate but related areas of investigation in empirical 
philosophy. A line of work investigating the nature of the “true” self finds that that the 
self, at its core, is not only moral, but also good (Newman, Bloom, & Knobe, 2014), 
including evidence that moral gains lead to less perceived identity change than moral 
losses (Tobia, 2016). Moreover, elements of morality have been implicated in a line of 
work investigating the “deep” self, which argues that identifying the true self has 
important implications for assigning moral responsibility (Sripada, 2016).   
What Is Special About Morality? 
This growing line of evidence highlights the importance of morals to human 
identity. However, it is still not clear why moral traits are perceived as essential. 
Although definitions of morality are vast, morals are broadly defined as an agreed upon 
set of norms within a society and are distinguished from other social norms primarily in 
the sense that they are more important or more valued (Hare, 1952). At their core, then, 
morals are inherently social (albeit in a special way), and any changes to morality are 
likely to impact more than one individual within a community (Heiphetz, Strohminger, & 
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Young, 2016). Specifically, Person A is likely to care about a change to the morality of 
Person B because Person A will no longer receive the benefits of being socially tied to 
Person B. Indeed, morality is a key dimension on which we perceive other individuals 
(Goodwin et al., 2014).  However, Person A is also likely to care about her own morality 
given that it impacts her social reputation.   
Implicit in this social dynamic is the idea moral traits are, in either case (change to 
other or change to self), quite important, or valuable, to the self. Indeed, Heiphetz, 
Strohminger, & Young (2016) found that the importance of traits to the self mediated 
judgments of identity change, with moral traits rated as more important, suggesting some 
role for value-based processing in moral perception. This line of reasoning is further 
supported by increasing evidence that value-based reasoning plays an important role in 
moral decision-making (Bench-Capon & Modgil, 2017). Although the deontological 
tradition within philosophy has long assumed that moral decision-making relies on 
logical reasoning, evidence increasingly suggests that reward and value-based processing 
drive moral decision-making (Shenhav & Greene, 2010; Shenhav & Greene, 2014). 
Specifically, when participants are asked to imagine a scenario in which they can either 
do nothing and risk the death of a large group of people or do something at the expense of 
a single individual, value-based sub-regions of the brain are largely involved in making 
these types of calculations, suggesting that moral reasoning, to a large degree, is driven 
by value-based calculation.  
Although mounting evidence suggests that morals tend to be both socially-
oriented and value-based, there are many ways in which a trait can fit both of these 
criterion, and it is worth considering how moral traits differ from other types of traits. For 
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example, an individual might value the interactions they have with a stranger because that 
stranger was warm and friendly towards them. Moreover, an individual might value the 
interaction they have with a stranger because that stranger demonstrated competence in 
an area and was helpful to them. Warmth and competence provide two key dimensions 
upon which people perceive one another (Fiske, Cuddy, & Glick, 2007). Although some 
moral traits are certainly lower in warmth and higher in competence (e.g., temperance or 
prudence), it is typically the warmer moral traits (e.g., honesty, loyalty) that most readily 
impact social preferences (Leach & Barreto, 2007) and social information gathering 
(Brambilla, Rusconi, Sacchi, & Cherubini, 2011). Therefore, it is hypothesized that 
warmer moral traits are more influential for the moral self effect, and that some sort of 
value-based processing drives it, but mechanisms underlying the moral self effect have 
yet to be explored. 
Practical Implications 
Clarifying the mechanisms underlying judgments of personal identity is important 
not only for furthering broader understanding of self, but it may also provide relevant 
insights to more translational work. The identity-value model of self-regulation states that 
identity serves as a salient value-input for facilitating successful self-regulation, and that 
stable, value-laden sources of identity are strongest (Berkman, Livingston, & Kahn, 
2017) (Chapter 1). If morality is, in fact, core to identity and is driven by value-based 
processing, it may be a candidate target for interventions seeking to promote behavior 
change. Of course, given that morality is so essential to identity, it may also be tougher to 
manipulate than other aspects of identity, but the evidence suggests to the contrary. 
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Indeed, appealing to moral identity can motivate moral behavior (e.g., Hardy & 
Carlo, 2005; Hardy & Carlo, 2011). Moreover, appealing to moral reasoning has been 
shown to motivate compliance on certain behaviors such as paying taxes (e.g., 
Blumenthal, M., Christian, C., Slemrod, J., & Smith, M. G, 2001; Ariel, 2012) and 
environmental conservation (Bolderdijk, Steg, Geller, Lehman, Postume, 2012; Hopper 
& Nielson, 1991). Given that many self-regulatory failures are often moralized (Rozin & 
Singh, 1999; Frank & Nagel, 2017), appealing to moral identities and values may also be 
an effective strategy for motivating successful self-regulation, as well. 
 Counterfactual thought experiments, such as those traditionally used by 
philosophers, might also play a key role in motivating self-regulation. Many effective 
self-regulation techniques already draw upon hypothetical and imaginative cognitive 
techniques encouraging individuals to think about themselves in new and alternative 
ways (Kross et al., 2014; White et al., 2016). Encouraging participants to imagine the 
degree to which they would become a new person if they were to achieve a goal (e.g., 
“become a whole new you!”) could provide an avenue for examining ways in which 
identity and value facilitate self-regulation. Exploring the mechanisms underlying the 
traditional moral self effect, although not directly related to translational applications, 
may be able to help motivate work in this direction.   
In fact, real world applications of the moral self effect are already being explored. 
For example, Strohminger & Nichols (2015) demonstrate that families of loved ones 
struggling with frontotemporal dementia (which impairs moral faculties), do actually rate 
these individuals as being different people (compared to pre-disease) more than families 
of individuals struggling with other health conditions, suggesting that moral changes can, 
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in fact, impact identity perceptions in the real world. These perceptions about the effects 
of disease may extend to perceptions about the effects of addiction, as well. A recent 
study found that people perceived an addicted person to be a different when compared to 
their non-addicted self, and that these perceptions are driven by moralistic judgments of 
the addiction (Earp, Skorburg, Everett, & Savulescu, under review). However, much 
more work remains to be done in this area. 
First and Third-Person Asymmetries  
 If the findings of the moral self effect are, in fact, going to be extended to have 
real-world implications, the role of target considered for the judgment of identity change 
must be considered. Specifically, if morality is going to be used as an identity-based 
motivator, the interventions would be applied in the first-person. However, personal 
identity, as examined in the traditional sense, is a third-person study of self, designed to 
draw conclusions about personhood, more broadly.  
 Traditional findings in social psychology examining person perception show 
pervasive effect of target, such that perceptions of self are often biased in certain ways in 
comparison to perceptions of another (and vice versa). The actor-observer bias 
demonstrates that although people are more likely to ascribe positive events to internal 
causes and negative events to external causes for themsselves, the opposite is true when 
judging others (Ross, 1977; Ross, Amabile, & Steinmetz, 1977). To a large extent, this 
asymmetry is a consequence of positive biases associated with the self: people generally 
tend to rate themselves above average than others on most things (Taylor & Brown, 1988, 
Sedikides, Gregg, & Toguchi, 2003). However, these biases are also simply influenced 
by the sources of knowledge we have about the self: in general, we more accurately 
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evaluate internal information about ourselves given our privileged access to it, whereas 
we are more accurate in evaluating external information about others, again, given the 
privileged access (Vazire & Carlson, 2010).  
Given that these first and third-person asymmetries are so pervasive in the field of 
psychology, similar findings would be expected within the field of personal identity. 
Moreover, if morality is fundamental for social reasons (as hypothesized above), these 
asymmetries would be expected to persist for judgments of identity change: people are 
expected to weight identity change differentially for self and for others given that they do 
not interact with themselves in the same way that they interact with others. However, to 
date, first and third-person asymmetries have not been observed for studies investigating 
identity change. One of the first studies to consider the role of target showed that a body-
switching paradigm yielded similar results regardless of target (Nichols & Bruno, 2010). 
More recently, no difference was observed in a series of studies directly comparing the 
moral self effect for self and a hypothetical other (“Chris”), albeit showing stronger 
effects for other compared to self on certain moral traits (Heiphetz, Strohminger, & 
Young, 2016). Another series of studies examining the effect of target across many 
different categories showed that the moral self effect holds across self, known friend, and 
unknown stranger, but not for a known enemy (although the self and friend condition 
were not compared directly), again showing a small to negligible effect of target for self 
and other. 
It has been hypothesized that the lack of asymmetry between self and other 
reflects the implicit positive nature of the moral self across most targets (Strohminger, 
Newman, & Knobe, 2016). Indeed, the true self literature has demonstrated that although 
  
 
66
our own true selves are deemed to be inherently good, so are the true selves of others 
(Bench et al., 2015). This lack of affective bias for moral traits may be one reason that the 
effect is not observed for cases of personal identity. However, there are other plausible 
reasons. Although there are well-known asymmetries for perceiving self and other, there 
are also asymmetries and biases for perceiving the self in the past, present, and the future 
(Ersner-Hershfield, Wimmer, & Knutson, 2008; Quoidbach, Gilbert, & Wilson, 2013), 
such that thinking about the self in a hypothetical thought experiment may not be the 
same as thinking about the self in the here and now. Moreover, many of the targets in the 
above studies were not specified others. Given that judgments of moral identity change 
may be driven by values, the values might change if a different, more concrete target 
were used, and actual perceptions of the target might influence the results. Regardless of 
whether the behavioral effects change in different circumstances, the mechanisms driving 
the effects, or lack thereof, remain to be explored. 
Underlying Brain Mechanisms 
 In sum, there are two types of mechanisms underlying the moral self effect that 
remain to be clarified. First, it is unclear why morality is special. Although it has 
hypothesized that morality is important for social reasons, the cognitive architecture 
underlying that “specialness” remains to be determined, with valuation as a plausible 
mechanism. Second, it is unclear why there is not an effect of target for judgments of 
personal identity. Even if a behavioral effect is found, it is unclear whether thinking about 
personal identity relies on similar mechanisms as engaging in traditional thought about 
self and other. Neuroscience can be a particularly helpful tool for dissociating the 
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mechanisms underlying a phenomenon (Berridge, 1996). The brain regions hypothesized 
to underlie these distinct elements of the moral self effect are reviewed below. 
Self and Other-Perception 
Neuroimaging studies investigating self-referential processing (in the traditional 
psychological sense) have primarily investigated the effects of trait-based perception, 
asking individuals to indicate whether a series of trait word describe themselves as well 
as another individual. This trait-based processing tends to recruit the cortical midline 
structures of the brain (precuneus and medial prefrontal cortex), with self-referential 
activity localized in the more ventral region of the medial prefrontal cortex and other-
referential processing localized in the more dorsal region of the medial prefrontal cortex 
(Denney et al., 2012; Wagner et al., 2012).  
Notably, these cortical midline regions of the brain are also involved in a whole 
suite of other types of cognitive processing, and there is debate as to what exactly these 
brain regions are tracking, especially given that information about the self (as compared 
to another person) varies on a variety of important dimensions. For example, as reviewed 
earlier in this chapter, information about the self tends to be inherently more positive than 
information about other individuals, and unsurprisingly, this difference is also reflected at 
the neural level, with self-referential neural activity sharing highly overlapping patterns 
with both positively valenced information (Chavez, Heatherton, & Wagner, 2017) and 
overlapping activity in regions of the brain that are closely tied to reward and value-based 
processing (Berkman, Livingston, & Kahn, 2017; Yarkoni, Poldrack, Nichols, Van 
Essen, & Wager, 2011). In fact, many have even claimed that the self is “nothing but 
reward” (Northoff & Hayes, 2011) or personal relevance (Kim & Johnson, 2015). 
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Information about the self, by its very nature, is also more familiar than information 
about other individuals, and brain regions tracking self-relevant information may be tied 
not only to value, but also to familiarity (Lin, Horner, & Burgess, 2016) 
Regardless of what is being tracked in these regions, the relative constellation of 
activity can be particularly informative, particularly along the ventral to dorsal gradient. 
Indeed, studies have shown that the closeness of a target to the self can be tracked such 
that targets closer to the self activate more ventral regions of the medial prefrontal cortex 
whereas targets less close to the self activate more dorsal regions of the medial prefrontal 
cortex (Mitchell, Banaji, & Macrae, 2006), with very close targets demonstrating 
overlapping activity (Zhu et al., 2007). Moreover, the activity within these regions varies, 
to some extent, with elements of hypothetical thought. Counterfactual thinking for self 
and for other has demonstrated a similar ventral to dorsal dichotomy in the brain 
(DeBrigard, Spreng, Mitchell, and Schacter, 2015). Thinking about the self in the future, 
too, tends to recruit regions of the cortical midline structures, as part of the default mode 
network (Buckner & Carroll, 2007; Buckner, Andrews-Hanna, & Schacter, 2008). 
Whereas some studies have found that thinking about the self in the future activates more 
dorsal (as compared to ventral) regions of the medial prefrontal cortex (Packer & 
Cunningham, 2009), other have found that thinking about the self in the future compared 
to the present simply recruits the ventral medial prefrontal cortex to a lesser degree 
(Ersner-Hershfield, Wimmer, & Knutson, 2008, Tamir & Mitchell, 2011; D'Argembeau 
et al., 2010). However, no study, to present knowledge, has investigated the type of 
hypothetical thought required for making identity change judgments. 
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It is unclear, then, whether neural activity associated with identity change 
judgments will show similar patterns of activity as those associated with traditional self 
and other-perception. On the one hand, these patterns are well-established and reliably 
elicited. However, judgments of personal identity do not show the same behavioral self-
other asymmetries as traditional self and other-perception in the social psychological 
literature, suggesting that thinking about personal identity for self and other might recruit 
more overlapping neural processes than is traditionally observed. At a general level, 
given that thinking about personal identity is very person-centered, activation in cortical 
midline structures of the brain is likely still expected. More specifically, if self-other 
asymmetries are absent from the personal identity literature because thinking about a 
hypothetical self is akin to thinking about another person, overlapping activity in dorsal 
regions of the medial prefrontal cortex might be expected. Alternatively, if self-other 
asymmetries are absent from the personal identity literature because thinking about 
another individual changing on a moral dimension is valuable to the self, overlapping 
activity in ventral regions of the medial prefrontal cortex might be expected. In either 
case, overlapping activity would likely suggest that thinking about personal identity is 
less target-centered than traditional self and other perception, lending support to the 
philosophical assumption that studying third-person personhood and studying first-person 
narrative are, indeed, two separate branches of self-study.  
Morality and Value 
The brain mechanisms underlying processing of different trait categories are less 
well understood. Aside from differences in positive and negative trait information 
(Glisky, & Marquine, 2009; Fossati et al., 2004), few studies have reported any neural 
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differences in processing the domain of a trait (Pfeifer et al., 2013; Pfeifer et al., 2009). 
One of the reasons why differences across traits are not reported is simply because effects 
of traits using traditional univariate analysis techniques are simply not found. However, 
more nuanced multivariate techniques are revealing differences in the neural 
representations of the types of information (e.g., rationality, social impact, and valence) 
that organizes our mental states for people (Tamir, Thornton, Contreras, Mitchell, 2016).  
Given that moral traits are deemed to be more essential to personhood than other 
types of information, it is hypothesized that some underlying mechanism would track that 
information. Although no studies to date have investigated the contribution of moral traits 
to self and other-perception, per se, many studies have investigated the neural 
mechanisms involved in moral reasoning. Perhaps most famously, in contrast to 
deontological arguments assuming that moral judgments require logical reasoning, recent 
neuroimaging evidence suggests that moral reasoning tends to recruit activity in value 
and reward-based regions of the brain (Shenhav & Greene, 2010; Shenhav & Greene, 
2014). Moreover, a recent meta-analysis found that tasks requiring moral judgment (vs. 
non-moral judgment) heavily recruited regions of the default mode network, leading the 
author to conclude that moral reasoning is largely intertwined with self-based processing 
(Han, 2017). Other recent work found that morals recruit more dorsal regions of medial 
prefrontal cortex, leading the authors to conclude that morals may be more akin to basic 
social cognition (Theriault, Waytz, Heiphetz, & Young, 2017).  
Based on somewhat sparse evidence, it is not entirely clear which brain regions 
might be involved in supporting the moral self effect. Given that morals are hypothesized 
to be important to self and that moral reasoning seems to heavily rely upon value-based 
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processing, it perhaps seems most plausible that moral traits will also recruit value-based 
regions of the brain, either selectively or simply more strongly, than other non-moral 
traits. Alternatively, given the hypothesized social role of morality, it is also possible that 
moral traits, relative to non-moral traits, will recruit more activity in dorsal regions of the 
medial prefrontal cortex. In maintaining these hypotheses, it is important to keep in mind 
that differences between moral and non-moral traits may not be detectable at a univariate 
level and may require subtler, multivariate methods.  
Present Study 
The following suite of studies aimed to extend the work on personal identity to 
better clarify the mechanism listed above, namely: 1) Why is morality special? and 2) Is 
thinking about personal identity for different targets similar to engaging in traditional 
person perception (and if so, why)? Given the hypothesized role of values in the moral 
self effect, I aimed to remove as many potential confounds in trait words as possible. 
Study 1 piloted and matched words on a variety of important dimensions, including 
valence in preparation for Study 2, which sought to replicate the basic moral self effect 
(Strohminger & Nichols, 2014) while controlling trait words for valence. Although these 
studies were exploratory in nature, it was hypothesized that trait words could be matched 
for valence and, given the large effect sizes reported in Strohminer & Nichols (2014) that 
the effect would replicate. Study 3 aimed to extend the moral self effect by comparing 
first and third-person perceptions of identity change. The moral self effect was predicted 
to replicate, and, despite the fact that self-other asymmetries are typically observed within 
social psychology, no main effect of target was hypothesized (Heiphetz, Strohminger, & 
Young, 2016). Finally, Study 4 used fMRI to examine the mechanisms underlying 
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thinking about personal identity for self and for other, as well as the mechanisms 
underlying the basic moral self effect. Again, the study was somewhat exploratory, but 
based on previous literature, it was hypothesized that a main effect of target would reveal 
differential activity in ventral and dorsal regions of the brain for self and other-based 
judgments of identity change, respectively, and that a main effect of trait would reveal 
stronger activity in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex for moral versus non-moral traits. 
No significant interaction effect was hypothesized. 
Study 1: Trait Development 
Method 
Participants. 351 participants (18 years of age or older; native English speaker; 
U.S. resident) were recruited from the Amazon Mechanical Turk population using 
TurkPrime’s data acquisition platform (Litman, Robinson, & Abberbock, 2017) to 
participate in a 15-minute online study rating different kinds of traits. Sample size was 
determined through a power analysis using G*Power (Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner, & Lang, 
2009) showing that a sample of 54 observations per trait would be required to detect a 
moderate effect size (d = .5) with 95% power using a two-tailed, one-sample t-test. 
Participants were excluded if they did not complete the survey, failed either of the two 
included attention checks, or completed the survey in less than 2 minutes. The final 
sample for analysis included 334 participants (129 female, Mage = 34.49, SD = 10.87), 
yielding the suggested number of observations per trait (M = 59.06, SD = 1.69).   
Design. Participants were randomly assigned to view and rate a total of 100 trait 
words (out of 281 possible trait words) for either its relevance to morality or its degree of 
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positivity. Trait words were selected to best represent the full range of possible moral 
(Strohminger & Nichols, 2015) and positively-valenced trait words (Anderson, 1968).   
Procedure. After completing the pre-screen and the consent form, participants 
completed a demographic form indicating their age, gender, ethnicity, and highest level 
of education. Participants assigned to rate traits for morality were instructed that they will 
see a series of traits and, for each, were asked “Is this trait related to morality?” (1 = Not 
at all related to morality, 7 = Extremely related to morality). Participants assigned to rate 
traits for valence were instructed that they will see a series of traits and, for each, were 
asked “How positive is this trait?” (1 = Neutral, 7 = Extremely Positive). Participants in 
both conditions were shown 100 traits words, presented randomly with 10 traits per page. 
At the end of the survey, participants were presented with a code to submit to MTurk in 
exchange for payment.  
Analysis plan. The primary analysis was to determine whether moral and non-
moral traits could be matched for valence. To do this, one-sample t-tests were run for 
each trait word in order to determine which traits were significantly different from the 
midpoint of the morality scale (4 = Somewhat related to morality). Of the traits that were 
significantly higher than the midpoint, the 40 trait words rated as being most relevant to 
morality were selected. Of the traits that were significantly lower than the midpoint, the 
40 trait words rated as most positive were selected. An independent sample t-test (equal 
variance not assumed) was run to determine whether these two lists of words differed in 
valence.  
Results  
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 I hypothesized that moral trait words could be matched with non-moral trait 
words on the dimension of valence. An independent sample t-test comparing the valence 
for the 40 trait words rated as being most related to morality (M = 5.72, SD = 0.50) and 
the 40 trait words that, of the words rated significantly lower than the midpoint on the 
morality scale were rated most highly for valence (M = 5.62, SD = 0.25), yielded no 
statistically significant difference (t(58.07) = 1.21, p = .23, demonstrating that moral and 
non-moral traits can, in fact, be matched for valence. Of note, as a result of the trait 
selection method, the variance for valence was larger for the moral trait words, and equal 
variance between the conditions was not assumed.  
Study 2: Replication 
Method 
Participants. 137 participants (18 years of age or older; native English speaker; 
U.S. resident) were recruited from the Amazon Mechanical Turk population using 
TurkPrime’s data acquisition platform (Litman, Robinson, & Abberbock, 2017) to 
participate in a 15-minute online study about personality changes. Sample size was 
determined through a power analysis using G*Power (Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner, & Lang, 
2009) showing that a sample size of 90 would be required to detect a small to moderate 
effect size (d = .3) (as reported for changes to moral versus personality traits in Study 3 
from Strohminger & Nichols, 2014) with 80% power using a two-tailed, paired-sample t-
test. Participants were excluded if they did not complete the survey, failed either of the 
two included attention checks, or failed one of the two task comprehension questions. 
The final sample for analysis included 109 participants (52 female, Mage = 35.33, SD = 
11.51). 
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Design. Participants were asked to make identity change judgments for both 
moral and non-moral traits (matched for valence, as determined in Study 1) in a within-
subjects design.  
Procedure. After completing the pre-screen and the consent form, participants 
completed a demographic form indicating their age, gender, ethnicity, and highest level 
of education. In the next section, drawing on the instructions from Study 2 from 
Strohminger & Nichols (2014), participants were asked to imagine that scientists have 
developed pills that, once swallowed, would permanently alter only one part of 
someone’s mind, without affecting anything else. This particular vignette was selected in 
order to avoid the temporal components present in many of the other vignettes. In the 
questions that followed, participants were instructed to imagine that someone took one of 
these pills such that everything about them exactly the same, except they are no longer X, 
with direction of change (decrease) specified drawing on previous work indicating that 
losses are treated differently than gains (Tobia, 2016). The scenario was presented 
separately for each of the 40 moral and 40 non-moral traits (selected from Study 1a), 
yielding 80 total questions, presented in randomized order with 10 traits per page. For 
each question, participants were asked “Do you agree they are still the same person as 
before?” (1 = Strongly disagree, 5 = Strongly agree). At the end of the survey, 
participants were asked to complete some task comprehension questions, some free 
response questions about the types of traits that led to more perceived identity change and 
about the nature of the target (i.e., the “someone”) that they thought about, questions 
about political orientation, the Moral Identity Scale (Aquino & Reed, 2002), and the 
  
 
76
Implicit Person Theory Scale (Chiu, Hong, & Dweck,1997). Finally, participants were 
presented with a code to submit to MTurk in exchange for payment.  
Measures. The primary dependent measure looked at identity change: to what 
extent would someone be a different person after experiencing the change? The scale for 
this dependent measure was adapted from the 1-100 point sliding scale originally used by 
Strohminger & Nichols (2014) into a 5-point scale in preparation for the fMRI 
experiment (Study 4). Of note, this scale was anchored such that lower scores would 
indicate more change, whereas Study 3 and 4 were anchored such that higher scores 
would indicate more change. 
Analysis plan. The primary analysis was to determine whether the effect between 
moral and non-moral traits originally reported by Strohminger & Nichols (2014) would 
replicate when matched for valence. A paired sample t-test between identity change 
ratings for moral and non-moral traits was used to test this question.   
Moreover, the results from this study were used to select 20 moral and 20 non-
moral traits for use in Study 3 and Study 4. Traits were selected to optimize for moral 
traits that most yielded perceived identity change relative to non-moral traits (i.e., 
optimizing for the “moral self effect”) while still controlling for valence, length, 
syllables, and frequency in the English language, as determined by comparing words 
from each group on an independent sample t-test.  
Results  
I hypothesized that the findings of Strohminger & Nichols (2014) would replicate 
such that perceptions of identity change for moral traits would be stronger than 
perceptions of identity change for non-moral traits, even when controlling for valence. A 
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paired sample t-test comparing the identity change ratings (with lower scores indicating 
more change) for both moral (M = 3.42, SD = 0.96) and non-moral (M = 3.82, SD = 0.96) 
traits yielded a statistically significant replication of the original results (t(108) = -6.14, p 
< .0001, supporting the hypothesis that moral traits are more essential to a person’s 
identity . 
Moreover, it was hypothesized that moral trait words and non-moral trait words 
could be refined to 20 per category to match on dimensions pertaining to valence, length, 
syllables, and frequency in the English language (Brysbaert & New, 2009). A series of 
independent sample t-tests revealed that the selected moral (M =5.81, SD = 0.39) and 
non-moral (M = 5.74, SD = 0.27) words did not significantly differ on valence (t(33.91) = 
0.65, p = .52); that the selected moral (M = 8.65, SD =2.56) and non-moral (M = 8.95, 
SD = 2.19) words did not did not significantly differ on word length (t(38) = -0.40, p = 
.69); and that the selected moral (M =2.34, SD =0.85) and non-moral (M = 2.40, SD = 
0.86) words did not did not significantly differ on frequency in the English language 
(t(38) = -0.22, p = .83), demonstrating, again, that moral and non-moral trait words can 
be matched on a variety of. See Appendix C for a full list of moral and non-moral words 
selected for use in Study 3 and Study 4.  
Discussion 
It was hypothesized that the moral self effect would replicate even when 
controlling. Indeed, participants rated that changes to moral trait would lead to more 
perceived identity change than changes to valence-matched non-moral traits, with a 
similar effect size as the original moral self effect. 
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 Previous work on the moral self effect has not controlled trait words on linguistic 
dimensions in any meaningful way, leaving open the possibility that valence may have 
been driving the original results. However, the results of this study, which used 
empirically driven lists of trait words, suggest valence is not a confounding variable in 
the moral self effect. Equally interesting is the finding that moral trait words can be 
matched for valence.  
 This set of results suggests that valence is likely not a defining feature of 
morality, leaving open the question, what is? The list of words used in this study, as well 
as in Study 3 (see Appendix C), seem to differ systematically on dimensions of warmth 
and competence. Indeed, a follow-up to the present study confirmed that participants 
rated moral trait words from this study more strongly on warmth and non-moral trait 
words from this study more strongly on competence (Livingston et al., in prep). These 
results indicate that there may not be something special about morality, per se, but 
something special about warmth. Whereas interacting with someone who lacks 
competence is a hindrance, interacting with someone who lacks warmth is more directly 
hurtful. Future studies may want to further probe differences between thinking about 
identity change judgments for traits differing on dimensions of warmth and competence. 
 The present study was limited in that, like previous research, it did not consider 
the role of target. Participants in this study were only asked to think about a general, 
unspecified person (i.e., “someone”), which, as discussed in the introduction, leaves the 
underlying mechanisms unknown. Participants instructed to think about a vague 
“someone” could be thinking about a specific individual as an example, could be thinking 
about the “average other,” which introduces positivity biases, or could be thinking about 
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themselves and their own trait values. Study 3 probes addresses this issue by specifying 
the particular target (self vs friend). 
Study 3: Extension 
Method 
Open science. The design, hypotheses, and analysis plan for this study were pre-
registered (currently embargoed) at the Open Science Framework (https://osf.io/8yw2p/).   
Participants. 137 participants (18 years of age or older; native English speaker; 
U.S. resident) were recruited from the Amazon Mechanical Turk population using 
TurkPrime’s data acquisition platform (Litman, Robinson, & Abberbock, 2017) to 
participate in a 25-minute online study about identity, personality, and values. Sample 
size was determined through a power analysis using MorePower 6.0 (Campbell & 
Thompson, 2012) showing that a sample size of 74 would be required to detect a small, 
within-subjects interaction (d = .2) with 80% power. However, previous work (Heiphetz 
et al., 2016) used a sample size of N = 103 with a similar design, so this study sought to 
collect usable data from at least 103 participants to match the previous work. Participants 
were excluded if they did not complete the survey, completed the survey more than once, 
failed more than two of six included attention checks, failed more than one of the two 
condition checks, or failed more than one of the two post-experiment checks. The final 
sample for analysis included 123 participants (67 female, Mage = 35.69, SD = 10.34). 
Design. Participants were asked to make identity change judgments for both 
themselves and another person, across both moral and non-moral traits (selected from 
Study 2) in a fully within-subjects design.  
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Procedure. After completing the pre-screen and the consent form, participants 
were asked to identify and type the name of a friend of the same gender and approximate 
age who they have known for at least one year and with whom they interact regularly 
(Moore et al., 2014). Identifying a friend who was familiar enough to think about but not 
too overlapping with the self was important in preparation for Study 4. In the next 
section, drawing on the instructions from Study 2, participants were asked to imagine that 
scientists have developed pills that, once swallowed, would permanently alter only one 
part of someone’s mind, without affecting anything else. In the questions that followed, 
they were instructed to imagine that either they (themselves) or their friend took one of 
these pills such that everything about them is exactly the same except they are no longer 
X, with conditions presented in randomized order. Within each condition, the scenario 
was presented for each of the 20 moral and 20 non-moral traits (selected from Study 2), 
yielding 40 total questions, presented in randomized order with 4 traits per page. For each 
question, participants were asked “How much would you (yourself) change?” or “How 
much would ____ change?” with the friend’s name piped in (1 = Same person, 5 = 
Different person). At the end of both conditions, participants were asked to complete 
some task comprehension questions, a free response questions about the types of traits 
that led to more perceived identity change, a free response question asking whether and 
why more change was perceived for themselves or for their friend, and some questions 
about their relationships with their friend (e.g., closeness, similarity). 
After completing the questions about identity change, participants were asked to 
rate the extent to which each of the traits is important to them. The question was asked 
for each of the 20 moral and 20 non-moral traits that they considered in the previous 
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section, yielding 40 total questions, presented in randomized order with 10 traits per 
page. For each question, participants were asked “How important is this trait to you?” (1 
= Not at all important, 5 = Very important).  Finally, participants were asked complete a 
question about their political orientation, the Moral Identity Scale (Aquino & Reed, 
2002), the Implicit Person Theory Scale (Chiu, Hong, & Dweck,1997), and a 
demographic form. Finally, participants were presented with a code to submit to MTurk 
in exchange for payment.  
Analysis plan. The primary analysis was to determine whether the “moral self 
effect” (Strohminger & Nichols, 2014) would hold more strongly when thinking about 
oneself as compared to a friend (or vice versa), whether the effect between moral and 
non-moral traits would replicate when thinking about these specific targets, and whether 
an interaction would reveal that thinking about identity change for oneself vs. one’s 
friend might yield stronger (or weaker) results for particular trait types. A repeated 
measures ANOVA was conducted to determine the main effect of target (self vs. friend), 
main effect of trait (moral vs. non-moral), and any potential interaction between target 
and trait.  
Results 
I hypothesized that the findings of Strohminger & Nichols (2014) would again 
replicate such that perceptions of identity change for moral traits would be stronger than 
perceptions of identity change for non-moral traits. However, based on the results of 
Heiphetz, Strohminger, & Young (2016), no differences between first-person (changes to 
self) and third-person (changes to other) judgments of identity change were predicted. 
Moreover, based on the results of Heiphetz, Strohminger, & Young (2016), it was 
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hypothesized that an interaction would be present such that participants would report 
stronger identity change for moral traits relative to non-moral traits when engaging in 
third-person vs. first-person judgments of identity change, but both of these analyses 
were somewhat exploratory. 
A repeated measures ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of trait (F(122) = 
8.51, p < .01) , such that changes to moral traits (M =3.65, SD = 1.01) led to greater 
perceived identity change relative to non-moral traits (M = 3.50, SD = 0.82), as well as a 
significant main effect of target (F(122)  = 5.94, p < .05), such that perceived identity 
change for self (M = 3.65, SD = 0.89) was perceived to lead to more change than 
perceived identity change for a friend (M = 3.50, SD = 0.95). However, the interaction 
effect investigating perceived identity change on moral (M = 3.70, SD = 0.98) and non-
moral (M = 3.60, SD = 0.79) traits for self and on moral (M = 3.59, SD = 1.04) and non-
moral (M = 3.40, SD = 0.85) traits for a friend was not significant (F(122)= 1.37, p = 
.24). 
Discussion 
 I predicted that this study would, again, replicate the moral self effect. Indeed, the 
basic moral self effect was, again, replicated here, although the effect was somewhat 
smaller than that reported in Study 1. The effect of target was somewhat exploratory, and, 
despite the social psychological literature predicting self-other asymmetry, no effect of 
target was hypothesized. Interestingly, the study did reveal a main effect of target such 
that stronger change was reported for self as compared to other, but again, the effect was 
relatively small. No interaction was hypothesized, and, as predicted, no interaction effect 
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between target and trait was found – moral changes led to greater perceived identity 
change than non-moral change for both self and other.  
 The significant main effect of trait adds to credence to the idea that the moral self 
effect holds when controlling for valence. As noted, the effect was somewhat smaller in 
this study than reported in Study 2, and there a few reasons why this might be. First, the 
exclusion criteria for this study were not quite as strict for this study as they were for 
Study 2 – participants were allowed to fail more attention checks and were not excluded 
for completing the survey too fast. Applying stricter exclusion criteria might strengthen 
the effect, but this possibility has not been explored given the pre-registered exclusion 
criterion. Moreover, it is possible that the subset of traits selected for use in this study 
show a weaker effect than the traits used in Study 2. However, that possibility seems 
unlikely given that traits were selected based on their identity change ratings in Study 2. 
Additionally, it is possible that the conditions introduced in this study (self and other) 
washed out some of the effects. Participants viewed and responded to each trait word 
twice, which may have dampened the impact of considering some of the trait changes. 
Lastly, and perhaps most likely is the idea that actual perceptions of targets influenced 
perceptions of identity change. Although actual perceptions of targets were not collected 
in this study, they were collected for Study 4. Ratings of trait importance to self collected 
in this study could also be used to (partially) test this hypothesis. once again, that the 
moral self effect holds, even when controlling for valence.  
The significant main effect of target suggests that traditional social-psychological 
phenomena influence philosophical reasoning about personal identity. Based on previous 
literature investigating self-other asymmetries in moral essentialism, the finding is 
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completely unsurprising. However, the personal identity literature has, of yet, failed to 
find an effect of target, a failure which philosophers have also noted as unexpected 
(Strohminger, 2016). One reason why the effect, albeit small, may have been observed in 
this study is that this is the first study to directly compare perceptions of identity change 
for two specific, real-world targets. Heiphetz, Strohminger, & Young investigated the 
effect of target but used a hypothetical other. However, comparing perceptions of identity 
change for self to perceptions of identity change to a hypothetical other may not have 
been the best approach in that the details about the hypothetical other had to be filled in 
by the participant, perhaps using information about the self to do so. Everett et al. (under 
review) investigated the effect of target and used a concrete other (a friend), and 
replicated the moral self effect for both, but did not test for an effect of target. One reason 
a concrete other may have yielded different results is that knowledge about the target may 
have been used to inform perceptions of identity change. For example, if a participant 
was asked to imagine that a friend is no longer honest, but that friend is not honest to 
begin with, the perceived change for that moral trait would not be very strong. If true, this 
would mean that individuals, on average, perceive themselves to be more moral than their 
friends. Given the lack of interaction, this would also mean that individuals, on average, 
perceive themselves to be higher on the non-moral traits, a likely finding given the 
literature on self-positivity biases. Unfortunately, this study did not collect data on actual 
self and other-perceptions, although these data were collected for Study 4. 
Again, these findings suggest that social psychological biases have the potential to 
influence philosophical reasoning, but, of course, this would not be the first time. 
Experiments from social psychology demonstrating the power of the situation (e.g., 
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Milgram, 1963 ; Darley & Latane, 1968) provided important challenges to moral 
philosophers and virtue ethicists arguing for the power of certain character traits. 
However, the interdisciplinary impact here is not one way. Psychologists need to be 
careful about the claims that can be made when adapting philosophical paradigms for 
their own interests. Personal identity is traditionally a third-person study of self that has 
been adapted here for use in the first-person. Whether personal identity adapted in this 
way still qualifies as the study of personal identity remains to be determined. 
For now, assuming that engaging in identity change judgments about the self qualifies 
as a form of personal identity judgment, future work will need to tease apart the degree to 
which personal identity and social psychological judgments for self and other rely upon 
the same underlying cognitive mechanisms. However, this is tricky to do using 
behavioral results alone, as it is still unclear how participants are treating the information 
about each of the targets in Studies 2 and 3. Study 4 uses neuroimaging to clarify these 
underlying mechanisms. 
Study 4: fMRI 
Method 
Open science. The design, hypotheses, and analysis plan for the behavioral pilot 
(Study 3) to this study were pre-registered (currently embargoed) at the Open Science 
Framework (https://osf.io/8yw2p/). Although the fMRI analyses reported here were not 
explicitly pre-registered, the behavioral pre-registration acknowledges that the study was 
designed with the intention of investigating the same effects of target and trait in the 
scanner.  
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Participants. 28 participants (18 female, Mage, = 24.57, SD = 4.57), with no 
history of psychological or neurological disorder, normal or corrected-to-normal vision, 
not taking medications affecting normal cognitive function, and right-handed from the 
University of Oregon community participated in a single-session fMRI study on 
perceptions of identity. Given that the task relied on subtle linguistic connotation and 
philosophical thinking, participants were additionally screened for native English 
speaking and for their undergraduate GPA (>3.0). No direct power analysis was 
conducted, but rather, the sample size was in line with the current recommendations for 
sample size in fMRI studies (Mumford & Nichols, 2008). 
Design. In the identity change task (modeled off of Study 3), participants were 
asked to make identity change judgments for both themselves and another person across 
both moral and non-moral traits (selected from Study 2) in a fully within-subjects design. 
Moreover, a self-localizer and values-localizer were included to allow for subsequent a 
priori ROI analyses, as well as for a multi-voxel pattern analysis (MVPA) between the 
localizer tasks, unrelated to the current study.  
Procedure. Before scanning, as in Study 3, participants were asked to identify 
and type into a Qualtrics survey the name of a friend of the same gender and approximate 
age who they have known for at least one year and with whom they interact regularly. 
Participants were then introduced to the pill vignette (from Study 2 & Study 3) and 
practiced a question thinking about themselves and a question thinking about their friend. 
Additionally, participants were introduced to a control condition in which they were 
asked to simply think about the trait itself, without any particular person in mind. 
Drawing from the personality literature (John & Robins, 1993) as well as control 
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conditions in similar studies (Moore, 2015), this control condition asked participants to 
evaluate the observability of the trait, considering the extent to which the trait can be 
easily observed in someone else (1 = Not observable, 5 = Very observable). In order to 
familiarize participants with the timing of all three tasks (identity change, self localizer, 
and values localizer), participants completed practice trials of each task prior to scanning.  
All scans were acquired on a 3T Siemens Skyra Scanner at the University of 
Oregon’s Robert and Beverly Lewis Center for Neuroimaging. Each scan session 
included the acquisition of epi field maps to establish any inhomogeneities in the 
magnetic field, a T1-weighted (MP-RAGE) anatomical image, one resting state scan 
consisting of echo-planar images (TR = 780ms, TE = 32 ms, matrix size = 84, 60 slices, 
slice thickness = 2.5 mm), and four functional runs of high-resolution, echo-planar 
images (BOLD-EPI) for each task (twelve runs total), collected using multiband scanning 
to avoid signal dropout in regions of interest (TR = 2000ms, TE = 25 ms. field of view = 
208 mm, matrix size = 104, 72 slices, slice thickness = 2 mm). Stimuli were projected 
onto a projector, which participants viewed using a mirror placed on the head coil. 
Psychtoolbox was used to present stimuli and to record participant responses, which 
participants indicated using a five-fingered button box placed under their right hand.  
After a brief scout scan localizing head position, each scan session began with a 
single, 15-minute resting state scan. For these scans, participants were instructed that they 
did not need to think about anything in particular but that they simply needed to keep 
their eyes open. Physiological data was collected concurrently to monitor heart rate and 
respiration.  
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The first and primary functional task investigated the brain mechanisms 
underlying judgments of identity change for self, other (friend), and a low-level control 
(observability) in an event-related design. On each trial of the task, participants were first 
presented with a cue indicating the type of upcoming trial (“Imagine you took a pill and 
are no longer…” ; “Imagine your friend took a pill and is no longer…” ; or “Think about 
how observable the trait is…”) (3000 ms), followed by the trait adjective (moral or non-
moral) paired with one of three cues (“Self,” “Friend,” or “Trait”) (6000 ms), followed by 
a rating period (4000 ms) in which either the word “CHANGE?” was presented asking 
participants to rate the extent to which someone who lost that trait would become a 
different person (1 = Same person to 5 = Different person) or the word “OBSERVE” was 
presented asking participants to rate the extent to which the trait word is generally 
observable (1 = Not observable to 5 = Very observable), followed by a jittered inter-trial 
interval period (M = 4000ms sec) (Figure 6). The same forty trait adjectives (20 moral 
and 20 non-moral, matched for valence) from piloting (Study 3) were used in this task. 
Participants rated each trait adjective for each target (self and other), yielding 80 total 
person-specific trials. Twenty of the same trait adjectives (10 moral and 10 non-moral) 
were randomly selected for each participant for presentation in the control condition. 
Trial ordering was optimized for signal detection across the relevant domains (self vs. 
other & moral vs. non-moral contrasts) using an established genetic algorithm (Wager & 
Nichols, 2003) such that trial condition ordering was fixed across participants, although 
the actual traits within each category were presented in a randomized order for each 
participant, across four runs.  
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In order to directly compare neural activation associated with thinking about 
identity change and the traditional “self” and “other” regions of interest in future 
analyses, the second task consisted of an established “self” functional localizer task 
(Moore, 2015) in which participants judged whether 40 trait words describe them or their 
friend. To avoid overlap with moral and non-moral trait words, trait words that were 
determined to not be significantly different from the midpoint on the morality rating scale 
in Study 1 were selected for use in this task (Appendix C). To optimize self and other-
referential neural activity, stimuli were presented in a blocked design, with two blocks of 
each condition (self and other) presented in alternating order for each run, across four 
runs. Each block contained five trials, and each trial consisted of an instruction period 
(“Describe me?” or “Describe friend?”) (2000ms), combined cue (trait) and rating period 
(yes or no) (2000 ms), and an intertrial interval (1000ms), with blocks separated by 
fixation (5000 ms).  
Lastly, in order to compare neural activation associated with making judgments of 
identity change with traditional “value-based” regions of interest (in future analyses), the 
final task consisted of a “willingness to pay” task commonly used in the neuroeconomics 
literature (Plassmann, O’Doherty, & Rangel, 2007) in which participants judged the 
amount that they would be willing to pay for different foods, both healthy and non-
healthy. To enhance the value-signal elicited during this task, participants were instructed 
to refrain from eating at least two hours prior to arrival. Moreover, participants were told 
that at the end of the scan, their responses would be entered into an auction in which they 
would randomly receive one of the food items for the amount they indicated (deducted 
from their participant payment amount) and to only bet what they would actually be 
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willing to pay. Participants were presented with 16 trials (8 healthy and 8 unhealthy) for 
each run, repeated with new food images across four runs. Each trial consisted of a cue 
period presenting the food image (2500 ms), a response period asking participants to 
indicate how much they would be willing to pay ($0, $0.50, $1.00, or $1.50) (3000 ms), 
and a jittered inter-trial interval (M = 4500 ms).  
 
 Upon completing the scanning portion of the study, participants completed a 
battery of questionnaires outside the scanner. First, participants completed some free 
response questions about the types of traits that led to more perceived identity change and 
about whether more change was perceived for themselves or for their friend. Next, 
participants were asked to rate the degree to which each of the trait words that they saw 
4000ms 
6000ms 
3000 ms 
~4000 ms 
Figure 6. Task structure for the 
identity change task. Participants 
completed trials imagining that 
the self changed, imagining that a 
friend changed, and control trials 
rating the observability of traits. 
Trait words were either moral or 
non-moral in nature. 
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in the scanner (moral and non-moral) actually describes themselves and their friend in the 
real world, with conditions (self and friend) presented in randomized, blocked order 
across participants. Within each condition, participated made ratings for each of the 20 
moral and 20 non-moral traits, yielding 40 total questions, presented in randomized order 
with 4 traits per page. For each question, participants were asked “How much does this 
word describe you?” or “How much does this word describe ______?” with the friend’s 
name piped in (1 = Not at all, 5 = Very much).  
At the end of both conditions, participants were asked to complete some questions 
about their relationships with their friend, including how long they have known their 
friend, how close they feel to their friend, how similar they are to their friend, how 
familiar they are with their friend, and how positive they feel about their friend. Next, 
participants were asked to rate the extent to which each of the traits presented in the 
identity change scanner task is important to them. The question was asked for each of the 
20 moral and 20 non-moral traits that they considered in the scanner, yielding 40 total 
questions, presented in randomized order with 10 traits per page. For each question, 
participants were asked “How important is this trait to you?” (1 = Not at all important, 5 
= Very important). Then, participants were asked to consider each of the foods that they 
had seen in the values task and to indicate how much they like it (1 = Dislike, 4 = Love). 
Finally, participants were asked to indicate their political orientation and to complete the 
Moral Identity Scale (Aquino & Reed, 2002), the Implicit Person Theory Scale (Chiu, 
Hong, & Dweck,1997), the NIH-toolbox Meaning and Purpose Form (Salsman et al., 
2014) (for use with the resting state data), and a demographic form. At the end of the 
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session, participants were given their randomly selected food item from the auction, 
payment, and a debriefing form. 
Analysis plan. Imaging data from the project was formatted in accordance with 
the Brain Data Imaging Structure (BIDS) (Gorgolewski et al., 2016), the file structure 
used internally by OpenfMRI.org, an organization that facilitates the use of highly 
accessible and reproducible preprocessing streams. DICOM images were converted to 
NIfTI using MRIConvert software (http://lcni.uoregon.edu/~jolinda/MRIConvert/). The 
BIDS formatted data were preprocessed (realigned, co-registered, segmented, and 
normalized to the MNI template) and quality checked using fMRIprep version 1.0.12 
(Esteban et al., 2017), one of the preprocessing streams available via OpenfMRI that 
utilizes custom code to generate advanced preprocessing streams and readable output 
using software from multiple neuroimaging packages. Preprocessed functional scan data 
outputted by the fMRIprep preprocessing stream was subsequently smoothed (with a 
6mm kernel) using SPM12.  
Statistical comparisons were computed using a general linear model for each 
participant. Activity was modeled separately with condition regressors for the instruction 
and cue period (with results reporting activity for the cue period, unless specified 
otherwise), and motion parameters estimated by fMRIprep (framewise displacement, 
thresholded at 0.8) entered as additional regressors. These regressors were convolved 
with the canonical hemodynamic response function in SPM12 and high-pass filtered with 
a 128 s period. This model was applied to all voxels within an explicit mask created by 
averaging and smoothing (6mm kernel) the structural images (gray matter and white 
matter) for each participant. Contrast estimate maps (e.g., self vs. other) were computed 
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separately for each participant, then imported to a random effects group-level analysis to 
estimate population-level effects. To correct for multiple comparisons, all reported 
contrasts were thresholded according to recommended parameters calculated by AFNI’s 
3dClustSim.  
The primary analyses were intended to parallel those of the behavioral analyses in 
Study 3, investigating the neural mechanisms associated with thinking about target (self 
vs. other), trait (moral vs. non-moral), and their interaction. A whole-brain analysis was 
conducted to investigate each of these questions, comparing statistical activation maps for 
self and other trials (collapsed across trait), non-moral and moral traits (collapsed across 
target), and their interaction using one-sample t-tests. Moreover, contrasts comparing all 
conditions to control, a series of follow-up contrasts (reported below) were conducted for 
exploratory and clarification purposes. All reported coordinates are in MNI space. 
Results 
 Main Effect of Target.  
Person vs. Control. Given the person-centered nature of the identity change task, 
it was hypothesized that, at a basic level, thinking about either first-person or third-person 
identity change relative to control would activate cortical midline structures traditionally 
associated with person-centered thought. Statistical activation maps for all person-
centered trials were compared relative to control (Figure 7). As predicted, cortical 
midline structures were activated for this thinking about person-level identity change 
relative to control, including the posterior cingulate cortex (PCC), medial prefrontal 
cortex (mPFC), and ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC). Notably, the medial 
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prefrontal activity was generally located at the more anterior end of the prefrontal cortex. 
Peaks for these activated regions are listed in Table 5.  
 
Table 5       
Identification of BOLD Signal Increases for All 
Identity Change Trials Relative to Control    
Neural Region (MNI Coordinates) x y z No. of voxels Peak T 
Posterior Cingulate Cortex 2 -56 38 920 7.14 
Right Occipital Lobe 24 -100 12 921 6.42 
Medial Prefrontal Cortex -2 58 16 491 5.52 
OFC / vmPFC 4 50 -18 202 4.77 
      
Note. Correction for multiple comparisons (FWE P < .05) applied using threshold of P 
< .001 and extent threshold of k = 157. OFC = orbitofrontal cortex, vmPFC = 
ventromedial prefrontal cortex. 
 
Control vs. Person. Conversely, the control task activated a series of brain 
regions compared to person-centered trials (Figure 8), including bilateral cerebellum, 
bilateral prefrontal cortex / inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) (with stronger left 
x = -4 z  = 23 
Figure 7. BOLD activity associated with making identity change judgments for all 
targets relative to control. Heat map refers to t values. Correction for multiple 
comparisons (FWE P < .05) applied using threshold of P < .001 and extent threshold 
of k = 157. 
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lateralization), left superior temporal gyrus, and pre-supplementary motor area (pre-
SMA). Peaks for these activated regions are listed in Table 6. 
Table 6       
Identification of BOLD Signal Increases for Control 
Trials Relative to All Identity Change Trials    
Neural Region (MNI Coordinates) 
x y z No. of voxels 
Peak 
T 
Right Cerebellum 30 -60 -32 206 7.26 
Left IFG / Lateral PFC -50 8 18 3129 7.18 
Left Parietal / Occipital Lobe -34 -74 44 1235 7.08 
Left Superior Temporal Gyrus -64 -56 -8 895 6.84 
Presupplementary Motor Area -8 10 52 623 6.6 
Right IFG / Lateral PFC 42 6 42 482 5.83 
Left Cerebellum -38 -62 -28 234 5.52 
Right Anterior PFC / VLPFC / 
OFC 
30 62 -6 467 5.52 
Right IFG / Lateral PFC 48 34 32 428 4.86 
      
Note. Correction for multiple comparisons (FWE P < .05) applied using threshold of 
P < .001 and extent threshold of k = 206. IFG= Inferior frontal gyrus, PFC = 
prefrontal cortex, VLPFC = ventrolateral prefrontal cortex, OFC = orbitofrontal 
cortex 
z = 15 y = -55 
Figure 8. BOLD activity associated with control relative to making identity 
change judgments for all targets. Heat map refers to t values. Correction for 
multiple comparisons (FWE P < .05) applied using threshold of P < .001 and 
extent threshold of k = 206. 
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Self vs. Friend. One of the primary analyses for this study focused on clarifying 
the mechanisms underlying the effect of target reported in Study 3. In line with 
previous work, it was hypothesized that thinking about oneself would recruit more 
ventral regions of the medial prefrontal cortex, whereas thinking about a friend would 
recruit more dorsal regions of the medial prefrontal cortex. Statistical activation maps 
for self trials were compared relative to friend trials. Somewhat surprisingly, brain 
regions activated for this comparison were somewhat sparse and limited to lateral 
regions of the brain, including the left lateral posterior parietal cortex and left 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. (Figure 9). Peaks for these activated regions are listed in 
Table 7.  
 
 
 
x = -30 z  = 28 
Figure 9. BOLD activity associated with making identity change judgments for 
self relative to friend. Heat map refers to t values. Correction for multiple 
comparisons (FWE P < .05) applied using threshold of P < .001 and extent 
threshold of k = 158. 
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Table 7       
Identification of BOLD Signal Increases for Identity 
Change Trials for Self Relative to Identity Change 
Trials for Friend    
Neural Region (MNI Coordinates) x y z No. of voxels Peak T 
Left Precuneus/ PPC /Lateral Parietal -28 -72 58 300 6.53 
Cerebellum -4 -72 -18 222 6.04 
Left dlPFC -42 42 28 277 6.03 
Right IPS / Parietal Cortex 28 -64 58 202 5.8 
Fusiform Gyrus / Inferior Temporal -50 -66 -14 537 5.79 
Right IPS / Parietal Cortex 32 -78 34 361 5.72 
Left Intraparietal / Inferior Parietal -54 -42 54 165 5.65 
      
Note. Correction for multiple comparisons (FWE P < .05) applied using threshold of 
P < .001 and extent threshold of k = 158. dlPFC = dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, IPS 
= Intraparietal Sulcus 
 
Friend vs. Self. Perhaps even more surprisingly, brain regions activated for friend 
trials relative to self trials included certain cortical midline structure of interest, including 
the posterior cingulate, as well as the ventral region of the medial prefrontal cortex, 
extending into the orbitofrontal cortex. Moreover, a region of the right anterior temporal 
lobe was recruited for this comparison (Figure 10).  Peaks for these activated regions are 
listed in Table 8. 
x =1 y = -7 
Figure 10. BOLD activity associated with making identity change judgments 
for friend relative to self. Heat map refers to t values. Correction for multiple 
comparisons (FWE P < .05) applied using threshold of P < .001 and extent 
threshold of k = 158. 
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Table 8       
Identification of BOLD Signal Increases for 
Identity Change Trials for Friend Relative to 
Identity Change Trials for Self     
Neural Region (MNI Coordinates) x y z No. of voxels Peak T 
Posterior Cingulate Cortex 6 -54 20 807 7.76 
Anterior Temporal Lobe / 
Parahippocampal Gyrus 58 -4 -20 221 6.47 
vmPFC / OFC 2 60 -14 162 5.53 
      
Note. Correction for multiple comparisons (FWE P < .05) applied using threshold 
of P < .001 and extent threshold of k = 158. vmPFC = ventromedial prefrontal 
cortex, OFC = orbitofrontal cortex 
 
Self vs. Control. Implicit to the results reported above (person vs. control; self vs. 
friend) is the assumption that self and friends trials, to a large extent, recruited 
overlapping activity in cortical midline structure of the brain. However, to verify that 
assumption, the peaks for each condition (self and friend) relative to control are reported below. 
Brain regions activated for self trials relative to control trials included certain cortical 
midline structure of interest, including the posterior cingulate, as well as the medial 
prefrontal cortex (Figure 11). Peaks for these activated regions are listed in Table 9. 
Friend vs. Control. Moreover, as expected, brain regions activated for friend 
trials relative to control trials included certain cortical midline structure of interest, 
including the precuneus / posterior cingulate, as well as the medial prefrontal cortex. 
However, activity here was located more ventrally, extending into the orbitofrontal cortex 
(Figure 12). Peaks for these activated regions are listed in Table 10. 
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Table 9       
Identification of BOLD Signal Increases for Identity 
Change Trials for Self Relative to Control     
Neural Region (MNI Coordinates) x y z No. of voxels Peak T 
Right Occipital Lobe 34 -84 0 1312 7.21 
Posterior Cingulate -8 -52 30 413 6.28 
Medial Prefrontal Cortex -2 58 16 526 5.25 
            
Note. Correction for multiple comparisons (FWE P < .05) applied using threshold of P 
< .001 and extent threshold of k = 100.  
 
Table 10       
Identification of BOLD Signal Increases for Identity 
Change Trials for Friend Relative to Control     
Neural Region (MNI Coordinates) x y z No. of voxels Peak T 
Precuneus / Posterior Cingulate 4 -56 34 1274 7.56 
vmPFC / OFC 4 50 -18 929 6.34 
Right Occipital Cortex 24 -100 1 105 6.02 
Right Occipital Cortex 34 -72 -16 113 4.93 
      
Note. Correction for multiple comparisons (FWE P < .05) applied using threshold of P 
< .001 and extent threshold of k = 100.  
x = -3 
Figure 11. BOLD activity associated 
with making identity change 
judgments for self relative to control 
trials. Heat map refers to t values. 
Correction for multiple comparisons 
(FWE P < .05) applied using 
threshold of P < .001 and extent 
threshold of k = 100. 
x = 2 
Figure 12. BOLD activity associated 
with making identity change 
judgments for friend relative to 
control trials. Correction for 
multiple comparisons (FWE P < 
.05) applied using threshold of P < 
.001 and extent threshold of k = 100. 
Heat map refers to t values. 
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Instruction period. For exploratory purposes, activity recruited during the 
instruction period of the task for person versus control trials and self versus friend trials 
was investigated, and it was hypothesized that this preparatory period would recruit 
similar brain regions as those recruited during the cue periods reported above. However, 
brain regions recruited for person versus control instructions periods were limited to 
bilateral regions of the occipital cortex (Figure 13). Peaks for these activated regions are 
listed in Table 11. No brain regions survived thresholding for the control relative to 
person-centered instructional cues. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 11       
Identification of BOLD Signal Increases for All 
Person-Related Instruction Cues Relative to 
Control Instruction Cues    
Neural Region (MNI Coordinates) x y z No. of voxels Peak T 
Left Occipital Cortex -18 -88 -4 492 6.78 
Right Occipital Cortex 18 -96 2 292 6.62 
            
Note. Correction for multiple comparisons (FWE P < .05) applied using threshold 
of P < .001 and extent threshold of k = 200.  
x = 17 z = 2 
Figure 13. BOLD activity associated with identity change instruction cues for all 
targets relative to control instruction cues. Heat map refers to t values. Correction 
for multiple comparisons (FWE P < .05) applied using threshold of P < .001 and 
extent threshold of k = 200. 
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Moreover, whereas no brain regions survived thresholding for the self instruction 
cue relative to the friend instruction cue, brain regions active for the friend instruction 
cue relative to the self instruction cue included a cluster in right occipital /visual cortex, 
as well as in left somatosensory cortex (Figure 14), implying some sort of extra visual 
preparation for friend trials. Peaks for these activated regions are listed in Table 12. 
 
Table 12       
Identification of BOLD Signal Increases for Friend 
Instruction Cues Relative to Self Instruction Cues    
Neural Region (MNI Coordinates) x y z No. of voxels Peak T 
(Right) Occipital Cortex 12 -78 -6 1498 7.78 
Somatosensory Cortex 
-
42 -30 58 220 4.78 
 
Main Effect of Trait. 
Moral vs. Non-Moral Traits. For the effect of trait, it was hypothesized that 
moral traits, given their relative importance to the self, would recruit more activity in 
x = 8 z = 0 
Figure 14. BOLD activity associated with identity change instruction cues for friend 
relative to self. Heat map refers to t values. Correction for multiple comparisons 
(FWE P < .05) applied using threshold of P < .001 and extent threshold of k = 219. 
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value and reward-based regions of the brain compared to non-moral traits. Surprisingly, 
however, no brain regions for this contrast survived thresholding.  
Non-Moral vs. Moral Traits. In contrast, non-moral traits relative to moral traits 
activated a relatively diffuse array of frontal and prefrontal brain regions, including 
multiple clusters within the left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex / inferior frontal gyrus, left 
temporal lobe, and bilateral inferior parietal lobe. This contrast also included regions 
within the cortical midline structures, including the posterior cingulate and the 
ventromedial prefrontal cortex (Figure 15). Peaks for these activated regions are listed in 
Table 13. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      
x = -4 z = -8 
Figure 15. BOLD activity associated with making identity change judgments for 
non-moral relative to moral traits. Heat map refers to t values. Correction for 
multiple comparisons (FWE P < .05) applied using threshold of P < .001 and 
extent threshold of k = 205. 
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Table 13  
Identification of BOLD Signal Increases for Non-Moral 
Identity Change Trials Relative to Moral Identity 
Change Trials     
Neural Region (MNI Coordinates) x y z 
No. of 
voxels Peak T 
Left dlPFC -22 22 42 2014 7.51 
Left Temporal Lobe -64 -44 -4 1612 7.38 
Right Inferior Parietal Lobe 40 -62 34 542 6.74 
Left Inferior Parietal Lobe -38 -74 46 931 6.72 
Left Cerebellum -48 -68 -42 212 6.48 
Right Temporal Lobe 58 -28 -24 825 6.35 
Left Inferior Frontal Gyrus -50 40 -8 403 6.22 
Posterior Cingulate -4 -54 14 331 4.7 
Right Lateral PFC / OFC 42 52 -8 804 4.68 
vmPFC -4 56 -10 446 5.76 
Subgenual Cingulate -6 32 -4 446 4.88 
Posterior Cingulate -4 -34 36 264 5.59 
      
Note. Correction for multiple comparisons (FWE P < .05) applied using threshold of 
P < .001 and extent threshold of k = 205. dlPFC = dorsolateral prefrontal cortex ; PFC 
= prefrontal cortex, OFC = orbitofrontal cortex; vmPFC = ventromedial prefrontal 
cortex   
 
Non-moral vs. moral traits for self. Simple contrasts for non-moral traits relative 
to moral traits were run for the self and friend condition were examined to determine 
whether either condition was driving the effect of trait. Many of the regions overlap with 
those from the overall non-moral versus moral trait contrast, including the bilateral 
temporal lobe and left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex / inferior frontal gyrus. However, this 
contrast also revealed activity in dorsomedial prefrontal cortex, a region that was also 
curiously found in the effect of target for self when viewed at a lower threshold (Figure 
16). Peaks for these activated regions are listed in Table 14. 
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Table 14       
Identification of BOLD Signal Increases for Non-
moral Identity Change Trials Relative to Moral 
Identity Change Trials When Thinking of Self    
Neural Region (MNI Coordinates) x y z No. of voxels Peak T 
dmPFC -8 28 58 202 6.37 
Left Temporal Lobe -68 -44 -4 779 5.87 
Right Inferior Parietal Lobe 44 -60 38 237 5.84 
Right Temporal Lobe 60 -32 -18 305 5.41 
Left IFG / PFC -52 28 8 121 5.03 
Left Angular Gyrus -38 -72 44 468 4.95 
Medial Superior Frontal Lobe -8 52 28 129 4.62 
      
Note. Correction for multiple comparisons (FWE P < .05) applied using threshold of 
P < .001 and extent threshold of k = 121. dmPFC = dorsomedial prefrontal cortex, 
IPL = inference parietal lobe, IFG = inferior frontal gyrus, PFC = prefrontal cortex  
 
Non-moral vs. moral traits for friend. Simple contrasts of moral traits relative to 
non-moral traits for the friend condition also did not reveal any brain regions surviving 
threshold, but non-moral traits relative to moral traits for the friend revealed activity in 
right parahippocampal gyrus / anterior temporal lobe (also found in the effect of trait) and 
x = -10 z = -6 
Figure 16. BOLD activity associated with making identity change judgments for 
self on non-moral relative to moral traits. Heat map refers to t values. Correction 
for multiple comparisons (FWE P < .05) applied using threshold of P < .001 and 
extent threshold of k = 121. 
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in ventromedial prefrontal cortex / orbitofrontal cortex (also found in the effect of target) 
(Figure 17). Peaks for these activated regions are listed in Table 15.  
 
Moral trials vs. control. Implicit to the results reported above (moral vs. non-
moral trials) is the assumption that moral and non-moral trait trials, to a large extent, 
recruited overlapping activity in cortical midline structure of the brain. However, to 
verify that assumption, the contrasts for each relative to control are reported below. Brain 
regions activated for moral trials relative to control trials included certain cortical midline 
 
Table 15       
Identification of BOLD Signal Increases for Non-
moral Identity Change Trials Relative to Moral 
Identity Change Trials When Thinking of Friend     
Neural Region (MNI Coordinates) x y z No. of voxels Peak T 
Parahippocompal Gyrus 54 -20 -28 223 5.7 
vmPFC / OFC -6 56 -12 171 5.36 
      
Note. Correction for multiple comparisons (FWE P < .05) applied using threshold 
of P < .001 and extent threshold of k = 211. vmPFC = ventromedial prefrontal 
cortex ; OFC = orbitofrontal cortex. 
 
x = -9 z =  -28 
Figure 17. BOLD activity associated with making identity change judgments for 
friend on non-moral relative to moral traits. Heat map refers to t values. 
Correction for multiple comparisons (FWE P < .05) applied using threshold of P 
< .001 and extent threshold of k = 113. 
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structure of interest, including the posterior cingulate, as well as the medial prefrontal 
cortex (Figure 18). Peaks for these activated regions are listed in Table 16. 
Non-moral trials vs. control. Moreover, as expected, brain regions activated for 
non-moral trials relative to control trials also included certain cortical midline structure of 
interest, including the precuneus / posterior cingulate, subgenual cingulate,  and medial 
prefrontal cortex. However, activity in the medial prefrontal cortex for this contrast was 
slightly more extensive (Figure 19). Peaks for these activated regions are listed in Table 
17. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
x = -2 z =  -28 
Figure 18: BOLD activity 
associated with making identity 
change judgments for moral traits 
relative to control. Heat map 
refers to t values. Correction for 
multiple comparisons (FWE P < 
.05) applied using threshold of P 
< .001 and extent threshold of k = 
100. 
x = -5 
Figure 19: BOLD activity 
associated with making identity 
change judgments for non-moral 
traits relative to control. Heat 
map refers to t values. Correction 
for multiple comparisons (FWE P 
< .05) applied using threshold of 
P < .001 and extent threshold of 
k = 100. 
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Table 16       
Identification of BOLD Signal Increases for Moral 
Identity Change Trials Relative to Control     
Neural Region (MNI Coordinates) x y z No. of voxels Peak T 
Right Occipital Cortex 26 -100 12 1030 5.07 
Posterior Cingulate -6 -52 32 620 5.01 
Medial Prefrontal Cortex -2 60 14 172 4.98 
            
Note. Correction for multiple comparisons (FWE P < .05) applied using threshold of 
P < .001 and extent threshold of k = 100.  
 
 
Table 17       
Identification of BOLD Signal Increases for Non-
Moral Identity Change Trials Relative to Control     
Neural Region (MNI Coordinates) x y z No. of voxels Peak T 
Precuneus 4 -58 40 1154 7.5 
Right Occipital Cortex 24 -98 14 149 6.14 
Medial Prefrontal Cortex 0 60 18 1239 5.98 
Subgenual Cingulate -6 30 -6 1239 5.85 
Anterior Middle Temporal Lobe -66 -16 -18 102 5.82 
Right Occipital Cortex 28 -80 -8 154 4.22 
      
Note. Correction for multiple comparisons (FWE P < .05) applied using threshold 
of P < .001 and extent threshold of k = 100.  
 
 
Moral vs. non-moral traits at baseline. Notably, no brain regions survived 
thresholding in either direction when comparing moral and non-moral traits in the control 
condition (no identity change judgments). The results reported above were only observed 
during identity change trials. 
Interaction. Based on the behavioral results from Study 3, no strong effect of 
interaction was hypothesized, but the results are reported here for completeness. No brain 
regions survived thresholding for the interaction in either condition (moral versus non-
moral trait ratings for self relative to non-moral versus moral trait ratings for friend or 
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non-moral versus moral trait ratings for self relative to moral versus non-moral trait 
ratings for friend). 
Discussion 
Main effect of target. I expected that both self and friend trials would reveal 
activation in cortical midline structure, with trials about the self recruiting more activity 
in ventral regions of the medial prefrontal cortex and trials about a friend (other) 
recruiting more activity in dorsal regions of the medial prefrontal cortex. Trials that 
involved thinking about people in general (relative to the control condition) did invoke 
activity in these cortical midline structures. However, no brain areas of interest were 
recruited to a greater extent during self versus friend trials, and, counter to the hypothesis, 
regions of the precuneus and the ventromedial prefrontal cortex, bordering on 
orbitofrontal cortex, were more strongly recruited for friend versus self trials. Overall, 
findings indicate that both self and other trials recruited overlapping activity within the 
medial prefrontal cortex, with some extra activity recruited for the friend condition in 
ventral regions. 
 The results are somewhat surprising given the established neuroscience literature 
on self and other processing. Self-processing usually recruits regions more ventral of the 
medial prefrontal cortex, and other-processing usually recruits regions more dorsal of the 
medial prefrontal cortex. Of course, there is a chance that strong overlapping activity was 
found because the friend was perhaps too similar to the self. However, previous studies 
still find significant self versus other differences when using a similar friend as a target 
(Moore et al., 2014). Moreover, there is a chance that the hypothetical nature of the 
thought experiment led to highly overlapping activity, but previous studies that used a 
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hypothetical counterfactual thinking manipulation for self and other showed the 
traditional separation between their respective patterns within the medial prefrontal 
cortex. 
 Instead, the overlap I observed may be indicative of the fact that thinking about 
personal identity simply does not recruit the same types of target-specific thinking as 
traditional social psychological phenomena. Rather, given its third-person perspective, 
thinking about personal identity may be more akin to thinking about personhood more 
broadly. Alternatively, it is possible that thinking about personal identity recruits a 
blended set of distinct cognitive processes: thinking both about importance to the self 
when thinking about the other target and considering others’ perceptions of oneself when 
thinking about the self, requiring complicated social cognitive processes in both 
conditions.  
The increased activity in vmPFC (OFC) for thinking about a friend may be 
informative for teasing apart underlying mechanisms. Given that this ventral region of the 
medial prefrontal cortex is typically recruited more for self- vs. other-referential 
processing, this result may provide evidence that importance to self drives many of the 
effects for thinking about a target: people care about others changing because it impacts 
them. Of course, this reasoning is still somewhat speculative. To further probe this 
hypothesis, future analysis may want to consider using more nuanced pattern analysis 
techniques to see whether neural patterns for self (vs. friend) on the localizer task are 
predictive of patterns of activation invoked while thinking about identity change for 
friend.  
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However, it is also worth noting that the increased ventromedial activity for friend 
relative to self (and control) is located quite ventrally, bordering on orbitofrontal cortex, 
introducing a new host of potential explanations for the finding. Activity in orbitofrontal 
cortex is less traditionally associated with self-referential thought and moreso with 
emotion-based decision-making (Bechara, Damasio, & Damasio, 2000). On the one hand, 
activity in this region might suggest an emotional response to the thought of a friend 
changing relative to self, an idea explored earlier in this paper: an identity change to a 
friend will likely impact the subjective experience of the perceiver. On the other hand, 
activity in this region might suggest some sort of increased deliberation or decision-
making, appealing to more of an effort argument (Rushworth, Behrens, Rudebeck, & 
Walton, 2007). This hypothesis is, to some extent, supported by the fact that thinking 
about a friend (relative to self) recruits preparatory activity in visual cortex, indicating 
that more effortful imagination might be required for this condition. Future analysis may 
want to further investigate this hypothesis by analyzing reaction times for the self and 
friend conditions. If the other condition is, in fact, more effortful, slower reaction times 
would be predicted, a behavioral result that has emerged in traditional self and other 
processing (e.g., Kelley et al., 2002).  
Main effect of trait. It was hypothesized that moral traits would recruit more 
value-based regions of the brain (e.g., vmPFC) relative to non-moral traits. Somewhat 
surprisingly, thinking about change in moral traits did not recruit different brain 
activation than thinking about change in non-moral traits. However, thinking about 
identity change for non-moral traits relative to moral traits recruited a suite of brain 
regions, including cortical midline regions (precuneus, vmPFC), as well as other regions 
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related to control-based processing (e.g., bilateral lateral PFC) and semantic processing 
(e.g., bilateral temporal lobes). Thinking about change in moral and non-moral traits both 
recruited cortical midline structures relative to control, although, again, these effects were 
strong for non-moral traits. No differences were seen between moral and non-moral traits 
at control.  
 The lack of increased activity for moral trials is surprising given the growing 
evidence suggesting that moral content does uniquely recruit certain regions of the brain, 
including the vmFPC, likely for value-based reasons, and sometimes the dmPFC, likely 
for social cognition reasons). This is not to say that moral trials did not recruit these 
regions at all while making identity change judgments – in fact, they did, but the activity 
was stronger for non-moral traits, as well as more diffuse. It is not entirely clear why non-
moral traits showed this pattern. Given that non-moral traits were rated higher in 
competence, it is possible that this “extra” processing is required for reasoning about 
more skill-based identity changes.  
However, it is also possible that considering these non-moral traits simply 
required more effort than reasoning about moral traits; moral traits may have been easier 
to process. If moral traits are, in fact, essential to a person, then it seems plausible that 
making judgments about how these moral traits might change would be more intuitive 
and less effortful. The claim is, to some degree, supported by the fact that although 
differences are observed for thinking about non-moral and moral traits during judgments 
of identity change, no differences are seen between thinking about these same moral and 
non-moral traits during control, suggesting that there is something special about thinking 
about morality in the context of an individual. In other words, there may not be anything 
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special about moral traits, per se, but moreso something special about the effects that 
those moral traits have on oneself or another individual; moral traits may only be 
contextually special. Future analysis could investigate the degree to which response times 
to trials for moral and non-moral trait words differ to further probe the possibility of an 
appeal to effort.  
Interaction. No interactions between target and trait were hypothesized, and none 
were observed. The null result was unsurprising given the behavioral results observed in 
Study 3. Moreover, a significant interaction would have been difficult to interpret given 
the possibility of inflated effects of interactions under some conditions within 
neuroimaging (Chavez & Wagner, in prep). Of course, it is possible that there are 
situations in which an interaction would be present – a case in which moral traits might 
be less important to identity than other traits for a given participant - but such a case lies 
outside the scope of this paper.  
Limitations and Future Directions 
 As mentioned earlier, one potential limitation of the current study is that targets 
were instructed to think about a relatively close friend. Although participants were 
explicitly instructed that the friend should not be their best friend, they were instructed 
that the selected friend should be someone they know well and with whom they interact 
on a daily basis. This degree of closeness increases the probability that effects between 
self and friend would not be detected, meaning that, in many ways, this was a very 
conservative comparison, and the specific nature of the psychological differences 
between the two are worth considering carefully. Future analysis may want to further 
examine the influence of target closeness by incorporating self-reported information 
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about the relationship with the friend (e.g., closeness) in the target analysis (e.g., as a 
parametric modulator). 
The experiment may have also been limited in its use of an event-related design. 
Behavioral studies to date investigating the role of target (see Study 3) have used a 
blocked design such that participants make all ratings for one target before making 
ratings for another target. Instead, trials for targets in this design were not blocked. This 
event-related design was chosen to both 1) maintain psychological interest on the 
relatively long trials and 2) to optimize for the ability to investigate trial-level trait effects 
(e.g., trait ratings) without worrying about signal interference from a blocked design. 
There is a chance that requiring participants to switch between targets washed out some 
of possible effects. Previous studies have shown strong self-other neural asymmetries 
using similar event-related designs, but this type of design may be less amenable to 
hypothetical thought experiments.  
 The implications of the results of the main effect of target are that the traditional 
findings for processing self versus other information, assumed to be robust, may be 
limited to thinking about the self in particular ways – ones that might be idiosyncratic to 
the way psychologists think about the concept of self. However, the self is a vast topic, 
long considered from different perspectives in other disciplines. Despite the overlap in 
content (the self), many of these competing perspectives have, to date, been overlooked 
within the fields of psychology and neuroscience. Considering and incorporating them 
may be important for extending and challenging traditionally held assumptions within 
both fields. To continue to push and understand the boundary conditions underlying 
certain psychological effects, future work will need to continue to consider different 
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perspectives on the self. For example, future studies might consider additional 
hypothetical and narrative approaches to self that rely upon a complicated area of 
underlying cognitive processes.   
  Another limitation of the present study is that it used valence-matched trait words 
in the tightest possible condition. Although this tightly controlled comparison was a 
strength for interpreting any possible neural differences, it did not allow as much room 
for detecting the moral self effect itself. In traditional studies on the moral self-effect, 
moral traits are compared to a large swath of person-level characteristics, including 
memories, non-valence matched personality traits, preferences, and desires. Future 
neuroimaging work may want to consider investigating how processing moral trait words 
compares with processing words in these other categories, albeit considering that other 
dimensions like valence may significantly impact the results   
Given the relative overlap between thinking about identity change for moral and 
non-moral traits relative to control, it is also possible that any effect of thinking about 
moral traits is simply not detectable using univariate techniques (e.g., subtracting the 
average degree of activation during one condition from the average of another). Future 
approaches may want to consider using multivariate classification techniques between the 
value-based or the self-based localizer and the identity change task to see whether a 
trained classifier can predict any differences between moral and non-moral traits. 
Previous work has demonstrated that trait-based patterns are more detectable using 
multivariate approaches (e.g., Tamir, Thornton, Contreras, & Mitchell, 2016), and given 
the person-centered nature of the trait words used in the study, it is plausible that these 
trait words are both encoded in similar, person-based regions of the brain, but in different 
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ways depending on their self-relevance or their value-signal. Future analysis may also 
consider incorporating behavioral ratings of change for a trait (as a parametric 
modulator). It is possible that although considering moral versus non-moral traits as 
separate categories did not reveal any neural differences under direct region-by-region 
comparisons, considering traits that were perceived to lead to more identity change 
would. Additionally, it is possible that actual perceptions of individual targets might have 
washed out the moral self effect to some degree, and future analysis should consider 
adjusting identity change ratings for those perceptions 
 Based on these results, the degree to which an explanation for morality as a 
special category should be sought remains unclear. On the one hand, morality may 
simply just be essential to identity, and there may not be any other explanatory 
mechanism (e.g., value-based processing or social cognition) required for understanding 
its uniqueness or its importance. On the other hand, many explanatory mechanisms have 
been hypothesized in the previous literature, and can be explored using novels 
experimental designs and methods. The degree to which this information would add 
explanatory power should continue to be considered in future work.  
General Discussion 
Knowns 
This suite of experiments replicated the original moral self effect (while ruling out 
valence as an underlying mechanism), revealed a possible effect of target for self versus 
other, and identified a number of brain regions underlying both effects, albeit in 
unexpected directions. In particular, overlapping activity was observed for the self and 
other conditions, with more activity in regions of the ventromedial prefrontal cortex / 
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orbitofrontal cortex observed when thinking about moral and non-moral trait changes in 
a close friend. Overlapping activity was also observed for the moral and non-moral 
conditions, with more overall activity (in cortical midline structures, temporal, and 
parietal regions) observed for thinking about whether non-moral traits might change.  
 The goal of the study was to address two separate but related questions. First, the 
study investigated whether thinking about personal identity for different targets is similar 
to engaging in traditional person perception, and the answer, for the most part, seems to 
be no. Although the behavioral evidence demonstrates that thinking about self yields 
larger perceived identity change than thinking about a friend, the neural evidence 
suggests that the mechanisms underlying judgments of identity change for oneself and a 
friend do not differ in expected ways. Thinking about identity change recruited brain 
regions typically involved in person perception, more broadly, but the typical ventral to 
dorsal split for thinking about self and other, respectively, was not observed. Rather, 
there was strong overlap when thinking about personal identity for self and other, 
suggesting that thinking about personal identity is not the same as engaging in traditional 
person perception, which typically results in strong differences between self and other. 
 Second, the study aimed to better understand why morality is special. Rather than 
obtaining explanatory answers, however, this study obtained evidence to the contrary: 
that morality may not actually be as special as has been hypothesized in the literature to 
date. Although the behavioral evidence replicated the finding that changes to morality are 
perceived to lead to more identity change than changes to other personality traits, the 
neural evidence did not support this claim. Rather, there was stronger activity in a variety 
of brain regions when thinking about non-moral versus moral traits whereas no such 
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activity was found for thinking about moral versus non-moral traits, suggesting that there 
may not be any particular mechanism driving the privileged status of moral traits within 
respect to personal identity. 
Unknowns & Future Directions 
 In the face of these conclusions, it is important to note that these results are 
complicated and represent an important and broader move towards a more naturalistic 
neuroscience (Zaki & Ochsner, 2009; Schonberg, Fox, & Poldrack, 2011; Tikka & 
Kaipainen, 2014). The thought experiments included in this study are abstract and require 
the detection of subtle and nuanced differences between conditions. As a result, a 
complicated array of underlying neural mechanisms were hypothesized. Humans are not 
simple, nor are the contents of our thoughts or experiences. As neuroscience moves to 
apply its findings to real-world contexts (e.g., Gabrieli, Ghosh, & Whitfield-Gabrieli, 
2015), understanding the ways in which people process more naturalistic, complicated 
sets of stimuli becomes increasingly important.  
 Of course, the stimulus sets used in this thought experiment are not directly 
naturalistic. Engaging in arm chair philosophy, at least on its surface, is quite different 
from the everyday experience of most people. As such, the conclusions born from this 
experiment are primarily limited to those speculating about the nature of personal identity 
and of morality. However, engaging in hypothetical thought experiments about one’s 
own identity change or that of a close, actual friend could easily be adapted to have 
important implications for a variety of translational work. For example, clarifying how 
people process hypothetical identity changes in another individual, whether they are 
suffering from disease or undergoing a gender transition, can help to understand and 
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predict the ways that we treat other individuals; clarifying how we process hypothetical 
identity changes in ourselves, whether we are motivated to become a different person 
through addiction treatment or whether we fear letting go of the person we are now whilst 
trying to lose weight, can help to understand and predict the ways in which individuals 
pursue their own goals. In this sense, this suite of studies sets a foundation for 
considering a complicated array of processes that lie at the core of who we are. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
DISCUSSION  
 
 
 
 One aim of the current dissertation project was to contribute toward an integrative 
study of self. An integrative study of self can be defined as one that unifies seemingly 
separate conceptions of self to meet broader functionalist and ontological needs. Chapter 
2 examined elements of self-complexity through an empirical investigation on multiples 
selves, and Chapter 3 examined elements of self-continuity through an empirical 
investigation on personal identity and the moral self. Both projects contribute to an 
integrative study of self in distinct but meaningful ways. 
 The work on multiple selves (Chapter 2) is integrative in that it applies network 
analysis techniques to the study of self. Network analysis techniques are only beginning 
to make their way into the field of psychology, more broadly (Costantini et al., 2014), 
and the set of studies presented in Chapter 2 are the first to use this network-based 
approach to examine the structure of the self. This introduction of network-based 
methods to the study of the self has implications for both advancing intervention-based 
work, as well as for addressing bigger questions about the nature of the self. Specifically, 
through measuring more nuanced about the relationships between different self-aspects, 
the network-based approach provides important information for designing more targeted 
identity-based interventions. In turn, more targeted identity-based interventions will 
allow researchers to avoid some of the uncertainties regarding the mechanisms 
underlying current, self-based manipulations (e.g., self-affirmation). This network-based 
approach also helps to address bigger questions about the nature of the self. One key 
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question centers around how the self is unified across content (Klein 2012b). This 
network-based approach provides a new method for measuring the degree of integration 
(or unification) across self-content. 
 Not only is the work on multiple selves integrative, but the work on personal 
identity and morality (Chapter 3) is integrative in that it uses neuroscience methods and 
social-psychological theory to addresses age-old questions in philosophy. Specifically, 
the study examines first and third-person judgments of identity change to determine 
whether traditional findings within neuroscience and social psychology apply to thinking 
about personal identity, which traditionally only considers a third-person perspective on 
the self. The findings of this integrative approach have a number of implications for both 
advancing intervention-based work, as well as for addressing bigger questions about the 
nature of the self. Notably, the study found that morals lead to more perceived identity 
change for both self and other, suggesting that morality constitutes an essential part of an 
individual’s identity. As a result, future identity-based interventions may want to consider 
targeting an individual’s moral identity in order to elicit long-lasting change. Moreover, 
the study found that, to a large degree, thinking about identity change for self and for 
other recruits overlapping brain activity. These findings suggest that thinking about 
personal identity for self and for other may be different than thinking about standard self 
and other-based perceptions, an insight which helps to inform bigger questions about how 
the self is unified across time (Klein, 2012b). 
Together, then, both of these studies consider broader definitions of self that have 
the potential to inform more translational work. A common theme between the 
definitions of self that were considered in these studies is that they both, to some degree, 
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draw on social elements of the self. The self-aspects that people list in the study on 
multiple selves tend to be related to social roles (Chapter 2), and morality is hypothesized 
to be essential to an individual’s personal identity because of its social nature (Chapter 3). 
These ideas are, in large part, in accordance with the “looking glass” perspective on the 
self, which hypothesizes that self-perceptions are drawn from the ways that other people 
in our social world see us (Cooley, 1902; Mead, 1934; Yeung & Martin, 2003). Indeed, 
evidence suggests that meta-perceptions, or perceptions of how others perceive us, serve 
as a particularly important source of self-knowledge (Carlson, Furr, & Vazire, 2010; 
Carlson & Furr, 2009), and that perceptions of others’ acceptance or rejection of us 
heavily determines self-esteem (Leary, Tambor, Terdal, & Downs, 1995), suggesting that 
social input largely influences both the information and the affect associated with self-
perception. Given the largely social nature of the self, future work may want to consider 
using certain social identities as an inlet for encouraging identity change. For example, 
individuals may be more amenable to identity change if the targeted identity is associated 
with an important social group (e.g., a favorite sports team) or if the intervention occurs 
during a period of social transition (e.g., moving to a new city or ending a romantic 
relationship).    
In addition to taking an integrative perspective on the self that considers broader 
definitions of the self for informing future translational work, another aim of the current 
dissertation was to contribute towards a larger organizational framework that considers 
the self, not only across traits, but also across roles (contexts) and narratives (time). Both 
sets studies reported in Chapters 2 and 3 contribute to this larger organizational 
framework at both levels. The multiple selves study (Chapter 2) contributes to the 
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literature on roles in that it characterizes the relationships between the different roles that 
people identify to be most important in their lives. Through investigating the structure of 
these relationships, researchers gain the ability to better understand the goals and 
motivates that guide an individual across different contexts. Moreover, the study 
contributes to the literate on narrative in that it characterizes the collection of characters 
that represent meaningful aspects of an individual’s life. Through investigating the ways 
in which these characters integrate and come together, researchers gain the ability to 
understand the types of narrative relationships that, over time, give an individual meaning 
and purpose.  
The study on personal identity and morality (Chapter 3), too, contributes to the 
larger organizational framework that considers both roles and narratives. First, in 
identifying morality as an especially core component of an individual’s own, self-
perceived identity, the study suggests that morality may also comprise a particularly 
salient motivator or role for an individual. Notably, however, the types of self-aspects 
listed by most individuals do not tend to be moral in nature (McConnell et al., 2011), 
raising the question of whether moral content is core to identity in the same way that 
particular self-aspects and roles are. Future work should consider exploring how the 
essential nature of morality actually plays out in everyday roles and contexts. The study 
also contributes to the broader literature on narrative. Although the study of narrative has 
been distinguished from the study of personal identity (Peacocke, 2014), there is an 
important temporal component that unites these approaches. Through studying 
perceptions of identity change, the study contributes to that element of narrative that 
identifies core elements of an individual’s identity across time.   
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Despite their contributions toward this broader, overall self-framework, the 
studies were limited in similar ways. Specifically, despite the push to move towards 
studying more role and narrative-based elements of self, both studies were still drawn 
from and inspired by trait-based approaches. The study on multiple selves investigated 
the relationships between the different self-aspects by asking participants to rate each of 
their self-aspects on a number of trait dimensions; the study on personal identity and 
morality investigated perceptions of identity change by asking participants to imagine 
different degrees of trait-based change. In this sense, the trait-based approaches used in 
these studies may have distracted from the more contextual and narrative elements 
included in the studies. However, given that trait words form the basis for the study of 
identity (McAdams, 1995), a trait approach, to some degree, is required in order to study 
of self at these higher levels. The trait-based approaches used here also allow for building 
incrementally off of previous work. Even so, future work will want to consider new 
methods and approaches for moving away from such trait-heavy approaches and towards 
more naturalistic ones. 
 Similarly, both are studies are also limited, to some extent, in that they both 
replicate and build off of previous paradigms. Replication, of course, is valuable for the 
advancement of knowledge, more broadly (Maxwell, Lau, & Howard, 2015). However, 
sticking to established paradigms too strictly may limit the ability to move towards a 
more naturalistic study of self. 
Future work will want to consider applying more contextualized and naturalistic 
approaches towards the study of role-based and narrative-based elements of self. A 
broader movement within social psychology is pushing for the study of real-world, actual 
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human behavior (Baumeister, Vohs, & Funder, 2007), and methods are being developed 
for doing so. For example, the electronic audio recorder (EAR) has been an effective tool 
for sampling real-world behaviors (Mehl, Pennebaker, Crow, Dabbs, & Price, 2001). 
Similar techniques could be advantageous for examining real-world self-integration (or 
complexity) across contexts as well as for sampling the types of stories that people tell 
about themselves.  
Taking a more contextualized and naturalistic approach is, by nature of the 
method, much more difficult to do in neuroscience. However, a push for more naturalistic 
study is being made there, as well (Zaki & Ochsner, 2009; Schonberg, Fox, & Poldrack, 
2011; Tikka & Kaipainen, 2014). For example, future studies might want to consider 
examining the neural mechanisms underlying processing of actual self-narratives. 
Narratives could be collected from participants using the life story interview (McAdams, 
2008), which asks people to detail high points, low points, and turning points from the 
course of their life thus far. Participants could then be presented with “scenes” from the 
written transcription of their life story while in the scanner. Although researchers are 
starting to understand mechanisms underlying story-processing, more generally 
(Baldassano, Chen, Zadbood, Pillow, Hasson, & Norman, 2016; Chen, Leong, Honey, 
Yong, Norman, & Hasson, 2017), and although the neural mechanisms underlying trait-
based self-relevant processing is well-understood (Denny, Kober, Wagner, & Ochsner, 
2012; Wagner, Haxby, & Heatherton, 2012), much less is known about the mechanism 
underlying the processing of self-narrative. The stability of identity provides a source of 
value, and thus value-based mechanisms would be hypothesized to play a larger role for 
more stable identities. Moreover, because event-structure is generally encoded as shifts in 
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the patterns of certain neural activity, pattern-based classification techniques would be 
particularly useful. Analyses of interest could probe content about particular self-aspects, 
investigating, for example, how stories about a goal-self or a moral-self are represented, 
and perhaps whether these patterns are predictive of identity consistent real-world 
behaviors, informing the degree to which narrative-based information (versus other types 
of self-relevant information) plays a role in determining future behavior. Moreover, these 
narratives could be probed across time, investigating, for example, how narratives 
changes after certain transformative life events, informing bigger questions about 
mechanism underlying identity change. Investigation of self-narrative is feasible and 
provides a viable future direction for work in this area.  
Although definitions of self within the field vary, studies such as that proposed for 
investigating the neural mechanisms underlying self-narrative can help to provide a 
landscape for understanding the relationships between the different elements of self. 
These definitions can be refined by work in philosophy and can inform translational 
approaches that seek to understand the effects of acting upon and engaging different 
elements of the self. In this sense, the current work is simply the start of a broader move 
towards an integrative study of self.  
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APPENDIX A 
 
TRAIT WORDS USED TO RATE SELF-ASPECTS 
 
Positive: Negative: 
  
Capable Disagreeing 
Comfortable Disorganized 
Communicative Hopeless 
Confident Immature 
Energetic Incompetent 
Friendly Indecisive 
Fun and Entertaining Inferior 
Giving Insecure 
Happy Irresponsible 
Hardworking Irritable 
Independent Isolated 
Intelligent Lazy 
Interested Like a failure 
Lovable Sad and Blue 
Mature Self-centered 
Needed Tense 
Optimistic Uncomfortable 
Organized Unloved 
Outgoing Weary 
Successful Worthless 
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APPENDIX B 
 
EXAMPLE RESPONSES TO WRITING PROMPTS 
 
Manipulation (Self-Integration) Condition: 
 
Self-Aspects: Electrician, Wife, Commuter, Dog Owner 
 
“Commuter self wants to get to work on time to make sure electrician self keeps a job.  
Commuter wants to be timely so electrician doesn't miss anything on the first part of the 
job.  Electrician self wants to bring home money so that wife self can contribute to the 
household.  Wife self wants to make the family as happy as possible which dog owner 
self can help with by keeping the dogs healthy, happy and well-groomed.  Dog owner self 
does her part so wife self can do other chores such as laundry and vacuuming.  
Electrician self also earns money to help dog owner self afford the care of the dogs.  
Electrician self provides the money for gas and car so that commuter self can commute.  
Commuter self helps wife self by calling the husband during the daily commute.  Wife 
self and dog owner self like to joke with the husband about the dogs. This makes every 
one feel good and happy.  Wife self makes sure lunch is packed for everyone and that 
helps commuter self get out the door in a timely fashion.  Dog owner self says goodbye to 
the dogs and helps commuter feel better about going to work.” 
 
Control Condition:  
 
“I wake up early in the morning. As usual I struggle to get up from bed, but I do, I put 
some clothes on, get my food and go out. I walk to work where I meet my colleagues. We 
chat for sometime and then everyone goes to work on their sections. I usually stay there 
during the two smaller breaks that we have. While I'm there I'm thinking of how to make 
more money while listening to something sports related. During lunch break I meet up 
with my colleges and my boss and we grab something to eat. After that I do the same 
thing until it's end of work day. I get off work and start planning on what should I do 
next. I go to the gym and work out, then if I need something from the groceries store I go 
and get it. I walk back to my place while meeting the usual people who do the same at 
that time. When I'm home I shower and browse the internet until it's time to go to bed. 
Usually I talk to some people from home on social media and/or watch a tv show too. 
Before going to bed I think about what should I prepare for the next day and go to bed.” 
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APPENDIX C 
 
MORAL AND NON-MORAL TRAIT WORDS 
 
Moral Traits Non-Moral Traits 
  
Truthful Intelligent 
Trustworthy Happy 
Kind Smart 
Genuine Capable 
Empathic Knowledgeable 
Principled Confident 
Sincere Independent 
Loyal Easygoing 
Compassionate Determined 
Fair Charismatic 
Tolerant Realistic 
Responsible Funny 
Understanding Educated 
Selfless Skillful 
Merciful Productive 
Faithful Perceptive 
Forgiving Articulate 
Respectful Adaptable 
Considerate Resourceful 
Altruistic Punctual 
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